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As on-demand labor platforms proliferate the independent contractor 
business model, plaintiffs’ attorneys in the United States have filed dozens 
of misclassification lawsuits to secure rights and protections for workers. 
The conventional wisdom is that if these lawsuits are won, then they will 
reverse the growth of insecure work. This Article challenges this widely-
held assumption. Using empirical research, I examine the trajectories and 
legacies of three celebrated misclassification lawsuits from earlier moments 
of transportation “gig work” in California: Tracy v. Yellow Cab 
Cooperative, Friendly Cab v. NLRB, and Alexander v. FedEx. Against 
many odds, plaintiff workers secured judicial recognition of employee status 
in each of these cases. The untold, post-litigation stories, however, were 
surprisingly grim: workers’ economic lives were no more secure—and in 
some cases more precarious—then before the lawsuits. While I maintain that 
such litigation plays an important deterrence role, this Article highlights the 
significant limitations of misclassification litigation victories in effecting and 
enforcing the rights of gig workers. Based on this data, I critique the (over) 
reliance on the private enforcement of employee-status to fight precarity in 
the on-demand gig economy and suggest lessons for future advocacy. 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past half-decade, how to address the economic insecurities 
of on-demand workers in the “gig economy”1 has been a subject of 
intense political, academic, and popular discussion.2 Largely in reaction 
 
 1. I define the “gig economy” as the labor market characterized by workers 
who are considered independent contractors and thus carved out of employment and 
labor law protections. The focus of this article is on the low-skilled and low-paid end of 
the gig economy, mostly constituted by workers engaged in on-demand service work 
such as chauffeur driving, food and goods delivery, home cleaning, gardening, and 
errand-running. 
 2. Collective anxiety about “gig workers” has set in across government, 
academic, and labor sectors. For example, in late 2015, the White House organized a 
conference around worker precarity in the gig economy. The conference was attended 
by President Barack Obama, who in his comments at the White House Summit on 
Worker Voice, articulated a concern that in the “on-demand” economy hard work and 
economic security are decoupled. He stated:  
We’ve got folks who are getting a paycheck driving for Uber or Lyft; 
people who are cleaning other people’s houses through Handy; offering 
their skills on TaskRabbit. And so there’s flexibility and autonomy and 
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to the phenomenal growth of Uber,3 billions of dollars of venture 
capital have funneled into platform startups with independent contractor 
 
opportunity for workers. . . . And all this is promising. But if the 
combination of globalization and automation undermines the capacity of the 
ordinary worker and the ordinary family to be able to support themselves, if 
employers are able to use these factors to weaken workers’ voices and give 
them a take-it-or-leave-it deal in which they don’t have a chance to ever 
save for the kind of retirement they’re looking for, if we don’t refashion the 
social contract so that workers are able to be rewarded properly for the 
labor that they put in . . . then we’re going to have problems. . . . So we’ve 
got to make sure that as we continue to move forward, both in this new “on 
demand” economy and in the traditional economy as a whole, hard work 
guarantees some security. 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the White House Summit on 
Worker Voice (Oct. 7, 2015), in Administration of Barack Obama, 2015 Remarks at 
the White House Summit on Worker Voice, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1, 7 (Oct. 7, 
2015). Two months later, the Department of Labor held a symposium on the “Future of 
Work” that focused on “the broad migration of longer-term employment relations to 
more attenuated, shorter-term work arrangements.” The Future of Work: Diving into 
the Data, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BLOG, FUTURE OF WORK (June 17, 2016), 
https://blog.dol.gov/2016/06/17/the-future-of-work-diving-into-the-data 
[https://perma.cc/4KJ7-BFRH]. While the Trump administration has since deleted the 
internet footprint of findings from that symposium (perhaps signaling a less critical 
stance toward the gig economy), a press release still remains on the Department of 
Labor’s website that as of September 2016, the Department was issuing grants to non-
profits to “expand portable retirement benefits for low-wage workers.” US Labor 
Department Announces More than $150K in Research Grants to Expand Portable 
Retirement Savings Plans for Low-Wage Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS 
RELEASE (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/wb/wb20160922 
[https://perma.cc/TJ6A-UHW3]. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
2017–2021 Strategic Enforcement Plan, too, takes aim at the gig economy. U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission Strategic Enforcement Plan Fiscal Year 2017–
2021. See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE 1, 7–8, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK4S-PGXQ]. 
Of course, academic papers on the subject abound. A search of “employee status” and 
“gig economy” on Google Scholar in September 2017 yielded no less than 149 hits. 
GOOGLE SCHOLAR: SEARCH RESULTS 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=%22employee+status%22+%26+%22
gig+economy%22&btnG=&as_sdt=1%2C50&as_sdtp [https://perma.cc/3LCW-
HYEM]. I have contributed two articles to this growing body of scholarship: V.B. 
Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker 
Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 120–22 (2017) [hereinafter Dubal, Wage Slave or 
Entrepreneur?]; V.B. Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, 
Regulation, & Labor Advocacy in San Francisco's Taxi & Uber Economies, 38 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 73, 75–77 (2017) [hereinafter Dubal, The Drive to 
Precarity]. The collective anxiety about the growth of the gig economy is not only 
national but global; at a 2017 international labor law conference I attended, roughly 
twenty-five paper presentations and one book talk were on worker precarity brought on 
by the independent contractor status of workers in the gig economy. 
 3. There are a number of ways to measure this growth. The most common 
way is through the capitalization of Uber. As of February 2017, the company had taken 
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business models conceived to disrupt, extend, or produce new service 
economies.4 In 2013 and 2014, the annual growth rates of such labor 
platforms ranged between 300 and 400 percent.5 Corresponding to this 
growth is an increasing number of workers who have been “gigging”—
performing services or delivering goods on-demand and at the direction 
of technology platforms, but without the safety and security of 
employment benefits.6 These on-demand workers join existing service 
workers not considered employees and thus ineligible for basic 
safeguards like minimum wage, overtime, workers’ compensation, 
unemployment insurance, freedom from discrimination at work, and the 
right to collectively bargain.7 While much attention is given to the 
insecurities faced by these tech-enabled gig workers,8 to date, almost no 
legislation at the city, state, or federal level has passed to address their 
 
over 12 billion dollars over fifteen rounds of investments. Jim Edwards, Uber’s Leaked 
Finances Show the Company Might—Just Might—Be Able to Turn a Profit, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-leaked-
finances-accounts-revenues-profits-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/8PF4-6GSW]. Equally 
impressive, however, is the participation rate of workers on the app. According to 
Forbes in May, 2015, “Uber's active driver base has grown from basically zero in mid-
2012 to over 160,000 at the end of 2014. The number of new drivers has more than 
doubled every six months for the last two years.” Brian Solomon, The Numbers Behind 
Uber’s Exploding Driving Force, FORBES (May 1, 2015, 12:27 PM) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2015/05/01/the-numbers-behind-ubers-
exploding-driver-force/#1523e9475750 [https://perma.cc/8V8Y-P8X2]. 
 4. According to a 2017 estimate, more than 25 billion dollars in venture 
capital has been invested in on-demand platforms. Sunil Rajaraman, The On-Demand 
Economy is a Bubble—and it’s About to Burst, QUARTZ (Apr. 28, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/532Y-FUBL]. Of this, 16.56 billion dollars has been invested in 
transportation and logistics platforms alone. Id. Most of these platforms use putative 
independent contractor labor. Id. 
 5. Ruth Berrins Collier, V.B. Dubal, & Christopher Carter, Labor Platforms 
and Gig Work: The Failure to Regulate 2 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, 
Working Paper No. 106–17, 2017), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/Labor-
Platforms-and-Gig-Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U2C-SFNF] [hereinafter Labor 
Platforms and Gig Work] (quoting Paychecks, Paydays, and the Online Platform 
Economy: Big Data on Income Volatility, JP MORGAN CHASE INST. 1 (2016) 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-volatility-
2-report.pdf) [https://perma.cc/7UZG-C78U]). 
 6. See, e.g., STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL: HOW THE “UBER ECONOMY” AND 
RUNAWAY CAPITALISM ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS 84–88, 108–09 (2015). 
 7. Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-In-Time Workforce”: On-
Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, 37 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 471–72, 479–80 (2016). 
 8. Workers in my own research have complained most significantly of their 
low, unpredictable wages. Other complaints include lack of benefits, unpaid wages, 
ratings system, threat of termination, stringent rules and regulations, and an inability to 
contact Uber service representatives. See, e.g., HILL supra note 6, at 88–89; De 
Stefano, supra note 7, at 483. 
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unprotected status as putative independent contractors.9 Instead, nearly 
all efforts to address the unstable work lives of gig workers have been 
through misclassification lawsuits filed to bring them under the 
employee umbrella.10 
One of the most important and internationally scrutinized examples 
of such attempts is O’Connor v. Uber,11 a misclassification class action 
filed against Uber in 2013. In addition to being the first lawsuit against 
the tech giant to have a (large) class of drivers certified, O’Connor was 
filed in northern California—a jurisdiction with both an expansive legal 
definition of employee12 and potentially sympathetic judges and jurors.13 
Conventional wisdom among analysts was that if O’Connor went to 
trial and the class won, then Uber would be forced to—at the very 
least—begin paying their California drivers like employees.14 This, 
many predicted, would pressure Uber to re-think their contractor 
business model, deter others from copying it, and impede the flow of 
investment into the sector. Some commentators went so far as to 





 9. Ruth Collier, V.B. Dubal, & Christopher Carter, Disrupting Regulation 
and Regulating Disruption: The Politics of Uber in the United States 17 (May 23, 2017) 
[hereinafter Disrupting Regulation] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 10. See id. at 15. 
 11. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-03826-KAW, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120406, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013). 
 12. The test for employee status under California state law is delineated in 
S.G. Borrello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 406–07 (Cal. 
1989). 
 13. Although a large class of drivers was initially certified by the court, a 
portion was de-certified after a Ninth Circuit decision overruling the district court 
decision on the issue of arbitration. See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 
1206 (9th Cir. 2016). According to a motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs’ 
attorney filed by Uber in August 2017, the plaintiffs’ attorney has solicited drivers from 
the de-certified class to bring as many individual claims as possible to arbitration. 
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Sanctions at 4, 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016)(Doc. 811). 
 14. See, e.g., Dianna Kapp, Uber’s Worst Nightmare, S. F. MAG., May 18, 
2016, http://www.llrlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Uber%E2%80%99s-Worst-
Nightmare.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCR5-A7TT].  
 15. Therese Poletti, The Lawyer Looking to Kill the “Gig Economy”, 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 8, 2015, 9:04 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-
lawyer-looking-to-kill-thegig-economy-2015-12-07 [https://perma.cc/VPR8-KJ7M]. 
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Illustration 1: Two of my clients—Gladys Quinones (far left) and Edward Escobar (far 
right)—joined fellow Uber drivers to object to the proposed settlement O’Connor. 
Many of these drivers had been relying on the misclassification class action to change 
their status to employees for wage purposes. Here, plaintiff objectors are outside the 
courthouse holding signs reading “Reject the Settlement” and “I am an Employee.”16 
 
In the course of my engaged research17 on regulatory responses to 
the on-demand platform economy, I found that after a class was 
certified in O’Connor, drivers,18 workers’ rights advocates, labor 
leaders, and sympathetic policy makers across the nation put on pause 
 
 16. Photo by Laura Waxmann, in Laura Waxmann, Uber Drivers Push Back 
Against Proposed Settlement in Suit, MISSION LOC. (June 3, 2016, 12:41 PM), 
https://missionlocal.org/2016/06/uber-drivers-push-back-against-proposed-settlement-
in-suit/ [https://perma.cc/H5WJ-2JVS]. 
 17. The impetus for this Article arose as I conducted engaged research for a 
larger project on workers, worker organizing, and regulation in the tech-enabled gig 
economy. This research included an ethnography of a group of Uber drivers working to 
improve their conditions, surveys of Uber drivers, and interviews with worker 
advocates, labor leaders, non-profit advocates, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and city and state 
regulators. As I describe in the body of the Article, I was struck by how hopeful my 
interlocutors were about the effectiveness of employee-status litigation to challenge 
exploitative working conditions in the Uberized gig-economy. 
 18. Hundreds of drivers officially objected to the proposed settlement in 
O’Connor v. Uber. See Tracy Lien, Late Arrivals: Uber Drivers who Missed Filing 
Deadline Are Still Bashing Proposed Lawsuit Settlement, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2016, 
1:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-objections-
20160527-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/PC85-P46A]. 
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attempts (through policy advocacy and organizing) to address the many 
grievances of platform gig workers.19 Although I represented Uber 
drivers in an official objection20 to the proposed O’Connor settlement, 
urging the plaintiffs’ attorney to take the case to trial, I was—and 
remain—skeptical as to whether a decision in this case would have a 
long-term impact on worker security. 
With these responses to O’Connor as a prompt, this Article probes 
the impact of misclassification litigation on the fight against precarious 
work.21 To assess the efficacy of these lawsuits, I examine three 
successful cases from the antecedent gig economy: Tracy v. Yellow Cab 
Coop.,22 Friendly Cab Co. v. NLRB, 23 and Alexander v. FedEx Ground 
Package System, Inc.24 These cases challenged the independent 
contractor status of taxi drivers (Tracy, Friendly Cab) and truck drivers 
(Alexander). Against many odds, the plaintiffs in each case won, 
establishing safety-net benefits (Tracy), secure wages (Alexander), and 
collective bargaining rights (Friendly Cab) for gig workers. 
These lawsuits share similarities with and bear lessons for today’s 
on-demand platform workers. Like today’s gig workers, plaintiffs in 
these cases labored in a grey zone with regard to their status as 
workers. They exhibited the legal characteristics of traditional 
employees: their work was a core part of the employer’s business; they 
were forced to abide by stringent rules and regulations; and they had 
limited entrepreneurial opportunity.25 But they also shared common 
experiences with independent contractors, namely, they labored on 
relatively flexible schedules and performed without the oversight of an 
on-site supervisor. Though these workers operated in a grey legal zone, 
 
 19. Gonzalez’s legislative aides told me that the reason they did not move 
forward with the gig worker bill is because the labor community asked them to hold off 
until O’Connor went to trial. The drivers who I study similarly were holding off on 
their organization and affiliation with a union until the case was decided. Declaration of 
Veena Dubal in Support of Objections to Class Settlement at 7–10, 17, O’Connor v. 
Uber Tech. Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (Nos. 3:13-cv-03826-EMC). 
 20. Id.  
 21. For purposes here, I define precarious work as work that lacks stability 
and the benefits of regulation. For a sample from the growing body of sociological 
work on the precariat see Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: 
Employment Relations in Transition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 2 (2009); GUY STANDING, 
THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 7–13 (2011); ANDREW ROSS, NICE WORK 
IF YOU CAN GET IT: LIFE AND LABOR IN PRECARIOUS TIMES 34–35 (2009). 
 22. No. 938786, slip op. at 2 (Super. Ct. Cal. Feb. 10, 1997). 
 23. 512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 24. 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 25. For an in-depth examination of the doctrinal test for employee status see 
my article Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 72. 
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a fact-intensive legal inquiry in each case led to an unlikely but positive 
outcome for the plaintiffs: employee status. 
In analyzing these lawsuits and their post-litigation effects, this 
Article draws on a long history of critical legal scholarship examining 
the role of litigation on social change.26 Taking on Michael McCann’s 
call to “assess how . . . [legal] struggles affect . . . constituents and 
their relations with the dominant groups over the long haul[,]”27 I 
investigate the enduring impacts of these misclassification lawsuit 
successes on the plaintiff workers.28 How have these legal victories 
affected their lives? To answer this question, I employ qualitative 
empirical methodologies including semi-structured interviews, 
ethnography (in the taxi context), and archival research. I then draw 
upon this data to make sense of the pre- and post-litigation realities of 
worker plaintiffs in Tracy, Friendly Cab, and Alexander.29 In each case 
study, the findings were counterintuitively grim: the evasion of 
workers’ rights persisted and workers continued to labor without 
protections. These misclassification lawsuits undoubtedly played and 
 
 26. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 23–24 (1978); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9–10 (2d ed. 2008); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE 
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 49–53 (2d ed. 
2004); Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 61 (2011); Scott L Cummings & Ingrid V Eagly, A Critical Reflection 
on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. (2001); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
95, 137–39 (1974); Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s 
“Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, 
in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
261, 261– 92 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).  
 27. Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in 
HOW DOES LAW MATTER? (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).  
 28 Id. at 97.  
 29. In addition to the interviews and examination of municipal and legal 
records, both the taxi worker cases studied in this paper are informed by both my 
practice as a public interest lawyer representing taxi workers (between 2008–2010) and 
by over two years of ethnographic research in the San Francisco taxi industry (between 
2010–2013). My observations on the contemporary on-demand platform gig economy 
includes one year of ethnographic and interview-based research amongst San Francisco 
Bay Area Uber drivers. This ethnographic and qualitative research of Uber drivers in 
the Bay Area is ongoing but began substantively in 2015. This research includes 
hundreds of hours of observation of Uber drivers in organizing meetings, fifteen in-
depth interviews of Uber drivers, over 250 Uber driver surveys, and extensive review 
of legal complaints against Uber and regulatory debates and decisions regarding Uber 
and Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) across U.S. cities and states. Much of 
the regulatory research was conducted as part of a larger project investigating the 
politics of Uber regulation; this project is being conducted with Professor Ruth Berins 
Collier and Christopher Carter, Department of Political Science, University of 
California, Berkeley.  
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continue to play an important deterrence role,30 both drawing public 
attention to these practices and dissuading some firms from embracing 
the independent contractor business model. But this research highlights 
the significant limitations of such litigation in effecting and enforcing 
stability and security for gig workers. 
Two important lessons arise from these findings. The first lesson is 
that the relative structural and political power of firms makes enforcing 
employee status in the gig economy a difficult, if not impossible, feat. 
In each of these case studies, employers escaped compliance without 
additional legal penalty. In Tracy, San Francisco taxi companies 
successfully deterred workers from enforcing their rights through 
threatened worker blacklists. In Friendly Cab, despite six years of 
litigation and a federal appellate court ruling, the Oakland taxicab 
company leveraged their substantial political clout and access to a 
fungible workforce to undermine the advocacy of worker leaders and to 
refuse to bargain with the union. Perhaps most ominously, in 
Alexander, FedEx used the Ninth Circuit’s decision as a roadmap, 
drawing on their legal and business acumen to alter their business 
model so that workers looked even less like employees under the 
established case law. These lessons on the structural and political power 
of capital to evade enforcement of employee status also illustrate how 
dependence on misclassification litigation in the gig economy may 
exacerbate worker precarity. In the aftermath of Friendly Cab, for 
example, immigrant taxi workers were pushed out of the industry and 
struggled without other employment options. FedEx truck drivers, too, 
suffered as the company re-wrote their contracts, resulting in job loss 
for some and increased risk and responsibility for others. 
The second lesson that I draw from these case studies is that 
litigating for employee status may obscure worker plaintiffs’ broader 
goals—especially in the gig economy. Surprisingly, plaintiff workers 
who whole-heartedly endorsed and participated in these lawsuits did not 
necessarily want to be employees. In Friendly Cab, the pursuit of 
employment status for unionizing purposes led workers astray from 
their original goal: self-ownership. And in Alexander, what plaintiff 
workers wanted from the beginning was to be treated like true 
 
 30. The deterrence role should not be diminished. For example, the Munchery 
CEO admitted that he chose to use employee drivers because he did not want to face 
misclassification litigation. See Caroline O’Donovan, What Happens When a Delivery 
Startup Tries to Pay Its Workers Well?, BUZZFEED (Apr. 14, 2015, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/can-mun?utm_term=.xjjl0vroZ#.dhq3oK 
BEp [https://perma.cc/CB72-ZA4Y]. “Prime Now” drivers, who drive for a company 
Amazon contracts in the Bay Area, were converted from independent contractors to 
employees overnight by the threat of a misclassification lawsuit. Interview with Beth 
Ross, Partner, Leonard Carder, LLP, in Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 26, 2016). 
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independent contractors, with the independence and entrepreneurial 
opportunity of small businesses. 
Though these lessons challenge the efficacy of employee rights 
enforcement in the gig economy, the findings in this Article are not 
intended to be a critique of rights more broadly.31 In many cases and 
contexts, the enforcement of employee rights has been effective and 
important. But for reasons elaborated in Part III, misclassification 
litigation—even under the best of circumstances—is not well-suited as a 
solo strategy for workers in the gig economy. In making this argument, 
I draw on the seminal work of Scott Cummings and Deborah Rhodes 
who observed, “that litigation, although a necessary strategy of social 
change, is never sufficient; it cannot effectively work in isolation from 
other mobilization efforts.”32 I emphasize that standalone litigation wins 
are ineffective for gig workers not just because of a lack of effective 
judicial enforcement power.33 They are also ineffective because 
employee status for workers in a “grey zone” cannot address their vast 
structural and political inequality with firms. To fight precarity enacted 
by the gig economy, misclassification litigation must be leveraged 
alongside other forms of political and legal activism that are attendant 
to worker self-visions and that build and nurture collective worker 
power.  
Before analyzing the case studies and deducing these lessons, the 
next section, Part I, situates contemporary gig work in the recent 
history of precarious work, connecting current patterns in the on-
demand labor platform economy with older models of contingent labor 
and making a case for why lessons from these antecedent lawsuits are 
important today. In this section, I also describe the existing responses 
to the production of precarious work by on-demand labor platforms—
noting the absence of organizing and legislative attempts and stressing 
an over-reliance on the enforcement of employee status through 
litigation. Part II uses empirical research to understand the trajectory of 
each case study, Tracy, Friendly Cab, and Alexander, and to assess 
their long-term impacts on worker plaintiffs. In Part III, I expand upon 
the lessons discussed above. I argue that the structural and political 
power of firms to evade enforcement and worker ambivalence towards 
employee status constrained the impacts of detached misclassification. 
Finally, in the Conclusion, I suggest possible advocacy paths forward. 
 
 31. Stuart Scheingold famously coined the term “the Myth of Rights” to 
describe how litigation diverts attention from the political roots of inequality. 
SCHEINGOLD, supra note 26, at 1–10.  
 32. Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: 
Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 605 (2009). 
 33. Id. at 607–08. 
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I. CONTEXTUALIZING CONTEMPORARY GIG WORK 
A central contention of this paper is that older patterns of gig work 
hold lessons for and are connected to the newer patterns much 
discussed today. Accordingly, this section situates the current model of 
platform-enabled independent contracting within the longer history of 
the “fissured workplace.”34 I discuss how and why independent 
contractor business models which were once localized in certain 
industries—like transportation—are now proliferating in the service 
industry via technology platforms. I then examine existing political and 
legal responses to the proliferation of platform-enabled independent 
contracting. Half a decade has passed since Uber—literally—hit the 
streets in San Francisco. Though celebrated by some scholars35 and 
commentators for the freedom and flexibility the work offers, one does 
not have to scratch far beneath the surface to discover the brutality of 
much of the platform-enabled work that followed. Since roughly 2013, 
increasing attention has been paid to the exploitation of on-demand 
platform workers who face such issues of wage theft, over-work, and 
even psychological manipulation.36 Below, I review the recent 
responses to this much-discussed precarity. 
A. New Industry Disruption or Old Worker Exploitation? 
Despite excitement about the rise of on-demand labor platforms as 
new and disruptive, many companies in the platform-enabled gig 
economy (popularly referred to as the “sharing economy”) build upon 
and intensify older patterns of capital shifts and re-organization. These 
patterns of change—beginning almost forty years ago—were enacted in 
large part to minimize corporate costs and change how capital gains 
were shared.37 Scholars have argued that these changes contributed to 
 
 34. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014). 
 35. See, e.g., ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016). 
 36 See, e.g., Labor Platforms and Gig Work, supra note 5, at 14–15. See 
also Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-
psychological-tricks.html [https://perma.cc/5KRY-YTFD] (discussing Uber’s use of 
behavioral science techniques to make their drivers behave in a way that increases the 
company’s profits); Noam Scheiber, Uber to Repay Millions to Drivers, Who Could be 
Owed Far More, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/economy/uber-drivers-tax.html 
[https://perma.cc/4TFF-4A2Q] (discussing tens of millions of dollars that Uber owes its 
drivers due to a “mistake” in the way the company calculated commissions).  
 37. WEIL, supra note 34, at 11. 
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the contemporary and growing dualization of the labor market—with 
low wages at the bottom and high gains at the top.38 In this section, I do 
not do justice to the full economic and sociologic literature explaining 
these patterns, but attempt to highlight some key and relevant 
observations. How did we get here? 
In the mid-1970s, alongside globalization and the rise of finance,39 
U.S. firms commenced both internal and external restructurings that 
continue today. Some corporations developed practices of “internal 
flexibility” and forms of organization founded on employee initiative.40 
This cultural and ideological shift pushed the individual 
responsibilization of work for both individual and collective security.41 
Many companies also initiated the process of externalizing risks and 
responsibilities not related to their core competencies.42 This latter 
change, motivated in part to “disembed capital”43 from the 
redistributive responsibilities cast upon business by the New Deal and 
post-New Deal order, is what economist David Weil calls the “fissuring 
of work.” Both practices are evident in the extreme in today’s platform-
enabled gig economy. On the one hand, workers are encouraged to act 
entrepreneurially and through self-initiative to make money for 
themselves and the firm. On the other hand, many of these firms claim 
that software is their core competency, and thus workers performing 
 
 38. Ruth Berins Collier, V.B. Dubal, & Christopher Carter, The Regulations 
of Labor Platforms: The Politics of the Uber Economy, BERKELEY ROUNDTABLE INT’L 
ECON. 1, 3 (2017) [hereinafter The Regulations of Labor Platforms]. 
 39. SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE 
NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 140 (1999). 
 40. LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 80–81 
(Gregory Elliott trans., 2005). 
 41. Between the 1930s and 1960s, the culture of large, industrial firms was on 
the “socialization of production, distribution and consumption, and collaboration 
between large firms and the state in pursuit of social justice.” Id. at 18. Firms 
employed Taylor-ist techniques of organization, and largely in response to pressure 
from the labor movement, they accepted their social and economic responsibility to 
workers, whose lives, because workers were understood also as consumers, were 
inextricably tied to that of the firm. Id. at 80–81. By the 1970s, this integration of 
workers into the social order began to wane. Instead of a firm culture that “yoked 
economic and technological progress to the aim of social justice,” firm culture shifted 
to “a project of [worker] self-realization, linking the cult of individual performance and 
extolment of mobility to the reticular conceptions of the social bond.” Id. at 217. This 
change is reflected by shifts in techniques of work, including the rise of expectations of 
multitasking and emphasis placed on “self-control and the development of autonomy.” 
Id. at 218. For an examination of how the entrepreneur became legally exalted in this 
process see Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 101, 116–131. 
 42. See WEIL, supra note 34, at 8. 
 43. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 11 (2005). 
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tasks and services through the software have been “externalized” as 
independent contractors. 
Weil describes the fissuring of work as a “seismic shift” from 
earlier parts of the twentieth century.44 Most large tech firms today 
operating at the top of their industries—from Apple to Uber—“no 
longer directly employ legions of workers to make products or deliver 
services.”45 Instead, employment—and the relationship between 
employers and their employees—has been casualized. While many 
companies focus on their core competencies, they shed in-house service 
workers, placing responsibilities for gardening, janitorial services, 
accounting, and other provisions of service to other employers.46 This 
makes social and legal accountability for worker safety and security 
murky and difficult to enforce. 
In addition to these outsourced relationships, a number of studies, 
including my own, have shown a rise in the vulnerability of 
“contingent” workers. Some contingent workers labor as precarious 
employees—as members of the “disposable, part-time and temporary”47 
labor force. These include just-in-time workers and temporary workers, 
who, while considered employees, do not benefit from many of the 
securities associated with full-time employment. Other contingent 
workers—including taxi drivers, truck drivers, nail salon workers, 
home care workers, and construction workers—labor as putative 
independent contractors. This casual or contingent sector of the work 
force has grown dramatically since the late 1970s. Contingent work 
grew seventy-five percent faster than the overall workforce from 1980 
to 1993, and by 1995, these “casual” workers constituted about one-
third of the workforce.48  
Most important to the analysis here is not just the reflection of 
these larger trends, but also that independent contracting is not new and 
did not originate with the platform-enabled gig economy. Independent 
contracting in the taxi industry, for example, began as early as the 
 
 44. WEIL, supra note 34, at 8. 
 45. Id.  
 46. These lead businesses in turn create “downward pressure on the marginal 
price” for the outsourced services. Id. at 15. Businesses competing for contracts for the 
outsourced service work face significant pressures to lower their own prices, which in 
turn impacts the more fungible workers that they employ. This pressure and 
subcontracting to a complicated network of smaller business units has itself contributed 
to a larger trend away from full-time regulated employment to “casual” employment. 
Id. This is true even on the higher end of the service industry. 
 47. Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, 
Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 558 (1996). 
 48. WEIL, supra note 34, at 272. 
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1950s and took off in the 1970s.49 Taxi companies went from paying 
their drivers a wage to leasing their vehicles to workers—demanding 
that drivers pay to work. Due to municipal regulations in the taxi 
industry, while this form of work was necessarily precarious, some 
semblance of security over wages and hours remained.50 In other 
industries, like truck driving and delivery services, companies like 
FedEx not only leveraged independent contractor labor as early as the 
1990s, but also effectively pushed for the deregulation of competition, 
making it easier to grow their companies but harder to regulate worker 
security. Thus, as I and my colleagues have discussed elsewhere, “with 
respect to employment trends, the [labor] platform economy is not so 
‘disruptive.’”51 Rather, on-demand platform companies build upon and 
exacerbate the prevalence of the fissured workplace: using independent 
contractor labor and pushing for (and frequently achieving) broader 
industry deregulation. 
What is disruptive about the platform economy is the rate at which 
technology and venture capital together have spurred the growth of 
precarious unregulated independent contractor work. While the number 
of contingent workers remained steady for much of the early 2000s, it 
has since taken off, corresponding both to the timing of the Great 
Recession (and the loss of full-time jobs) and the rise of the on-demand 
labor platforms.52 
In some ways, the new on-demand labor platforms reflect the 
business models and strategies of taxi companies and FedEx put 
together, making the case studies in this Article even more relevant. 
These new gig firms combine the on-demand service models of taxi 
companies whose workers are paid in piece-rate with FedEx’s strategy 
of forced deregulation and requirement of worker capital investment. 
This latter point is key. While taxi companies continued to bear 
financial responsibility for the upkeep of vehicles, the dispatch 
technology, and the commercial insurance to cover potentially injured 
parties, many on-demand labor platform companies claim they are 
merely technology businesses that cyber coordinate service 
transactions. They thus push all associated costs and risks of business 
onto workers—including those liabilities related to the companies’ core 
competencies.53 
 
 49. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 96–97. 
 50. See Dubal, The Drive to Precarity, supra note 2, at 116–18.  
 51. The Regulations of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 4. 
 52. Labor Platforms and Gig Work, supra note 5, at 4.  
 53. Uber and Lyft, for example, require their drivers to purchase (or lease) 
vehicles, pay for commercial or hybrid personal-commercial insurance, pay for their 
phones, pay for all the associated car upkeep costs, and pay for gas. See, e.g., Jennie 
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B. Existing Responses to Tech-Enabled Gig Work 
The fact that contemporary on-demand platform labor continues 
and intensifies older models of precarious work makes the case studies 
herein particularly important. But the additional impetus and perceived 
need for this Article arises from my and my colleagues’ research on the 
regulatory responses in both political and legal spheres to the labor 
conditions proliferated by such companies.54 
Over the last half-decade, Uber and similar tech-enabled gig 
companies have taken center stage in public debates about the growth of 
precarious work. As mentioned above, journalists, academics, and 
policy makers across the political spectrum have spent immense 
amounts of time discussing and strategizing about what some have 
called a “new world of work” in which companies claim they are not 
employers and workers are excluded from the protections accorded 
most employees over the last century. Global conferences proliferate on 
the matter, with hundreds of thousands of dollars of foundation and 
university money being spent on “thinking” about what to do in 
response. And yet, almost no state action has been taken on the 
matter—either by legislatures or agencies assigned to address labor 
issues.55 Instead, almost all efforts to protect gig workers have been 
 
Davis, Drive at Your Own Risk: Uber Violates Unfair Competition Laws by Misleading 
UberX Drivers About Their Insurance Coverage, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1097, 1101–02 
(2015) (“Ride-sharing is a transportation service whereby people without commercial 
licenses use their own personal vehicles to provide rides to strangers for a fee.”); Avi 
Asher-Schapiro, Is Uber's Business Model Screwing Its Workers?, MOYERS & CO. 
(Oct. 1, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/10/01/ubers-business-model-screwing-
workers/ [http://perma.cc/NC8W-M7U8] (“Uber drivers have no say in the pricing, 
yet they must carry their own insurance and foot the bill for gas and repairs—a cost of 
56¢ per mile, according to IRS estimates.”). In addition, drivers must also do 
managerial tasks and the unpaid work of making sure they are paid correctly, 
calculating and paying their taxes, and figuring out how best to work to optimize 
earnings. See, e.g., Alison Griswold, Uber Drivers are Comparing Fares with Riders to 
Check Their Pay From the Company, QUARTZ (Apr. 13, 2017) 
https://qz.com/956139/uber-drivers-are-comparing-fares-with-riders-to-check-their-pay-
from-the-company/ [https://perma.cc/8JDB-Z9B5] (“Independent Drivers Guild . . . 
encouraged drivers to compare their fare with their passenger’s in Uber and other ride-
hailing services.”); Tax Tips for Uber, Lyft, Sidecar, and other Car Sharing Drivers, 
TURBOTAX (2016) https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/tax-tips/Self-Employment-
Taxes/Tax-Tips-for-Uber--Lyft--Sidecar-and-other-Car-Sharing-Drivers/INF28820.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZYQ6-SW3J] (Explaining, “So when you receive a payment, 
understand that it's not a traditional ‘paycheck,’ and likely no taxes have been taken 
out. It's up to you to take care of federal and state income taxes, as well as Social 
Security and Medicare.”). 
 54. For some of these findings see Labor Platforms and Gig Work, supra note 
5, at 19–20.  
 55. The Regulation of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 2.  
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made via private enforcement mechanisms, either by individuals in 
administrative contexts or—most commonly—by plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
class actions.56 
Counterintuitively, most legislative efforts on matters of gig work 
since 2012 have enforced the status of gig workers as independent 
contractors carved out of employment and labor laws.57 For example, 
despite widespread allegations of inadequate income and dangerous 
conditions for workers in the on-demand platform economy, the 
Florida,58 North Carolina,59 Arkansas,60 and Indiana61 state legislatures 
have all passed laws codifying the position of on-demand transportation 
platform companies that their drivers are independent contractors.62 
In contrast, no state legislatures have passed laws to either enforce 
existing employee rights for gig workers or to create new rights for 
them.63 An attempt was made in 2016, by California Assemblywoman 
Lorena Gonzalez, who almost introduced a bill that would have given 
all independent contractors in the state the right to collectively 
 
 56. Id. at 30–35.  
 57. Id. at 21.  
 58. Gig Economy Game-Changer? New Florida Law Ensures Contractor 
Status for Drivers, FISHER PHILLIPS; LEGAL ALERTS (Apr. 25, 2017), 
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 59. Heather Sommerville & Dan Levine, Exclusive: U.S. States Pass Laws 
Backing Uber’s View of Drivers as Contractors, REUTERS, (Dec. 10, 2015, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-statelaws/exclusive-u-s-states-pass-laws-
backing-ubers-view-of-drivers-as-contractors-idUSKBN0TT2MZ20151210 
[https://perma.cc/3Y2Q-MX8P]. North Carolina is particularly interesting because of 
their simultaneous work to fight independent contracting in the construction industry. 
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organize. The bill, however, was stymied both by the proposed 
settlement in O’Connor, which was to produce an Uber-funded “worker 
association,” and by the state’s labor community which was divided 
over the strategy.64 Many believed that the bill “gave-in” to the 
independent contractor business model and that energy should instead 
be spent forcing companies to comply with existing collective 
bargaining laws.65 As Gonzalez’s legislative aide told me after the bill 
was pulled (perhaps not coincidentally on the same day that the 
proposed settlement in O’Connor was announced), “Everyone in [the] 
labor [community] kept saying, ‘Let’s see what happens with this 
misclassification case [O’Connor], maybe they will [be found to] be 
employees’ . . . that was their push back before. What are they going 
to say now?”66 
The Teamsters Joint Council 7 Political Director, Doug Bloch, 
said the same, “When [Gonzalez’s] bill was drafted, we thought maybe 
it wasn’t needed because of the [O’Connor] class action.”67 While 
Assemblywomen Gonzalez vowed to propose a similar bill the 
following year in 2017, what she introduced was instead much weaker: 
a measure mandating an in-app tipping option for on-demand platform 
companies.68 This bill, too, was later pulled. 
Even elected bodies in progressive cities, which are often places of 
innovative political regulation in support of workers’ rights, have been 
largely silent on issues faced by gig workers. Only two cities across the 
nation (Seattle and New York City) have passed ordinances to address 
the precarities posed by completely unregulated, low-income work. 
Seattle—which is much discussed—is the lone municipality that passed 
legislation specifically targeting the insecurities of on-demand 
transportation workers (namely Uber, Lyft, and taxi drivers), granting 
 
 64. Kate Conger, California Bill to Give Gig Workers Organizing Rights Stalls 
over Antitrust Concerns, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 21, 2016), 
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 65. See supra note 29. 
 66. Telephone Interview with Laurel Brodzinsky, Legislative Aid, Office of 
Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez (Apr. 22, 2016). 
 67. Interview with Douglas Bloch, Political Dir., Teamsters Joint Council 7, 
in Oakland, Cal. (May 3, 2016). 
 68. Liam Dillon, Uber Would Have to Allow Drivers to Collect Tips from 
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them the right to collectively bargain.69 New York City also passed a 
bill focused on addressing wage theft experienced by freelancing 
workers. The city council codified existing contract laws and gave 
freelancers a more accessible form of recourse.70 This measure, 
however, likely has little impact on-demand platform workers whose 
payment is largely electronic and automated. Elected venues in cities 
like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Austin, which are known for 
worker-friendly initiatives including minimum wage ordinances and 
locally-funded health insurance for workers, have been surprisingly 
silent on gig worker issues. Thus, despite collective anxiety about the 
impact of technology on the future of work, almost nothing has passed 
to address the grievances of workers. 
State agencies tasked with addressing labor issues have also been 
reticent to publicly respond to the issues raised by tech-enabled gig 
work. The federal Department of Labor initiated a grant-giving process 
to encourage non-governmental organizations to “think” about portable 
benefits for such workers.71 Though the Alaska Workers’ Compensation 
Board found Uber to be in violation of the state’s laws and fined them 
accordingly, the state legislature went on to specifically exempt on-
demand transportation companies from these laws in order to lure the 
companies back to the state.72 The National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) has been relatively more active than other agencies, but even 
their efforts have been stymied by the legal objections and the foot-
dragging of tech firms. The NLRB Regional Office in San Francisco 
initiated an investigation in early 2016 as to whether Uber drivers have 
been misclassified as independent contractors under the National Labor 
Relations Act.73 But this process has been slowed by Uber’s tenacious 
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legal opposition.74 More recently, the NLRB Boston office filed a 
misclassification complaint against Handy Technologies, Inc. which 
cyber coordinates home-cleaners and home-cleaning tasks.75 Analysts 
predict the outcome of this case—which may take many years—will be 
dependent on the political composition of the NLRB.76 
Thus, in the “new” gig economy, political regulation addressing 
worker grievances has been scant and regulation codifying worker 
precarity has been the norm. This inaction to address workers’ issues 
has put a tremendous amount of pressure on misclassification cases to 
solve the problems posed by the gig economy. 
In sharp contrast to state-initiated actions (or lack thereof) to 
address the precarity of on-demand gig workers, private actors have 
mobilized to regulate Uber on employment issues. Plaintiffs’ class 
action attorneys have filed dozens of misclassification cases against on-
demand platform companies. For example, between 2012 and 2016, 
misclassification cases constituted approximately one-third of litigation 
against Uber.77 Almost all pressure to regulate the gig work produced 
by on-demand platform companies has thus arisen in the judicial 
context.78 And despite extraordinary legal hurdles posed by expensive 
discovery, financial incentives to settle, and uncertain arbitration laws, 
the majority of commentators agree that, “[t]he most effective way for 
[gig] workers to resolve the question of whether they are employees or 
independent contractors is a class-action lawsuit.”79 But none of these 
lawsuits have yet achieved anything but settlements—which, while 
potentially important for temporary wealth-distribution and 
deterrence—leave the issue of worker identity unresolved.80 The 
question remains, however, if one of these cases overcame the 
arbitration hurdle,81 certified a large class, and won employee status, 
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might it produce much-needed security and stability for workers? The 
answer, as I discuss below, is likely no. 
II. THE ANTECEDENT GIG ECONOMY & THE PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
In Part II, I examine three best-outcome case studies of similarly-
situated gig workers in the antecedent gig economy who, absent the 
technology of labor platforms, performed transportation services as 
independent contractors at the behest of companies. In each case study, 
firms structured themselves to avoid the risks and costs associated with 
employment. In Tracy v. Yellow Cab, a legal-aid non-profit 
organization sued San Francisco’s largest taxi companies, alleging that 
their taxi workers were employees for purposes of safety-net benefits—
unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation.82 In Friendly Cab 
v. NLRB, attorneys for the Teamsters challenged the classification of 
Oakland taxi drivers as independent contractors under the National 
Labor Relations Act and prevailed, securing for drivers the right to 
collectively bargain. And in Alexander, plaintiffs’ attorneys sued 
FedEx, contesting the independent contractor status of drivers for wage 
and income purposes under California’s labor code.83 Judges examined 
the facts of each case in relation to the applicable legal definition of 
employee and found the workers to have been misclassified by the 
firms.84 And yet, in all three cases, employee rights were either 
unsustained or never realized. Based on interviews with workers, their 
attorneys, and labor advocates, I describe and make sense of these 
outcomes. 
A. Tracy v. Yellow Cab Cooperative 
In 1996, taxi workers in San Francisco won employee rights on 
summary judgment—an unlikely outcome in a misclassification case, 
especially one that had dragged on for so long. This was one of very 
few misclassification legal victories achieved on behalf of workers in 
the taxi industry nationally. Four years after the Legal Aid Society-
Employment Law Center filed a class action on behalf of taxi workers 
against San Francisco’s largest cab companies, Superior Court Judge 
William Cahill extended workers’ compensation and unemployment 
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rights to five thousand San Francisco taxi drivers,85 those who labored 
for Yellow Cab, DeSoto, and Luxor.86 In the same decision, Judge 
Cahill banned these companies from charging taxi workers any cash 
bond or “security deposit” as a condition of employment.87 One of the 
lead attorneys for the taxi workers—Christopher Ho—told reporters that 
the decision came at a time when “the big trend [wa]s for employers to 
try to characterize people as independent contractors.”88 Plaintiff taxi 
workers were thrilled with the outcome.89 
Many in the California labor advocacy community understood the 
decision in Tracy as a “turning of the tide”—an example of how 
California courts could and would deliver a judicial check on businesses 
that misused the independent contractor business model to evade 
responsibility for their workers.90 Though attorneys did not secure an 
appellate decision to generate precedent on the matter, they hoped that 
the outcome would help San Francisco workers and simultaneously 
deter other taxi companies from utilizing the “leasing” model. 
But by the time I began working with San Francisco taxi drivers in 
2008—twelve years after the Tracy decision—leasing was the ubiquitous 
practice of taxi companies nationally and the rights established in Tracy 
had mostly been lost to time.91 Few workers in the industry knew that 
these safety-net benefits were available to them.92 Taxi companies by 
and large did not comply with California laws regarding unemployment 
insurance, and they either threatened drivers who needed to file for 
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workers’ compensation or fought them tooth and nail. Only one relic of 
the Tracy victory remained: twice between 2008 and 2010, worker-
advocates successfully evoked the decision to rein in companies that 
demanded security deposits. 
 
Illustration 2: Excerpt from a letter written by a taxi worker plaintiff to attorneys at the 
Employment Law Center praising Judge Cahill’s decision. He emphasizes, “[i]t is now 
payback time for these past 20 years of unfair and illegal labor practices . . .”  
 
In this case study, I analyze both the pre- and post-litigation stories 
of taxi worker plaintiffs who participated in this misclassification 
litigation. I explain how taxi workers in San Francisco became 
independent contractors, and how Tracy was conceived as a proxy 
battle to challenge the misclassification trend. I also tell the story of 
how the lawsuit impacted workers after the case was won. Unlike many 
class actions, Tracy was litigated by public interest attorneys for whom 
worker agency was vital, and workers informed every stage of 
litigation. But in spite of the legal victory, the enduring impact of Tracy 
on even the most active worker-plaintiffs neither sustained long-term 
mobilization, nor the mobilization of their employee rights. 
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1. WORKERS FIRST: LITIGATION, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL 
CHANGE 
Public interest attorney John True filed Tracy v. Yellow Cab in 
1991, just two years after the California Supreme Court decided S.G. 
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations.93 In 
Borello, the court laid out a broad definition of who constituted an 
employee under California law. The decision held that for California 
state employee rights protections (including wage-related rights, 
unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation), the most 
significant consideration of whether a worker was an employee was if 
the putative employer retained the “right to control work details.”94 But 
the court also gave weight to other factors, including whether the 
worker who performed the “services [wa]s engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business” from the putative employer.95 The addition of 
this and other factors to the traditional “right to control” test for 
employee status made it more likely that putative independent 
contractors would be found misclassified. 
Soon after the Borello decision, John True, who founded 
Employment Law Center’s Workers’ Rights Clinic—a workers’ rights 
clinic for low-income workers in San Francisco, began to win cases for 
taxi drivers who came to the clinic. True explained the genesis of the 
Tracy litigation: 
Early on, we started seeing taxicab drivers come to the clinic. 
One guy, Garth Chojnowski, comes to mind. He was living in 
his car and got fired. He was a driver for Yellow, and applied 
 
 93. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). 
 94. Id. at 403–04. 
 95. Id. at 404. The court emphasized that in addition to whether or not a 
putative employer has the right to control the means and manner in which the work is 
done, additional factors should be considered to determine whether the worker is an 
employee. Id. Those factors include: 1) Whether the person performing services is 
engaged in an occupation or business distinct from that of the principal; 2) Whether or 
not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal or alleged employer; 3) 
Whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place 
for the person doing the work; 4) The alleged employee's investment in the equipment 
or materials required by his or her task or his or her employment of helpers; 5) 
Whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 6) The kind of occupation, with 
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
principal or by a specialist without supervision; 7) The alleged employee's opportunity 
for profit or loss depending on his or her managerial skill; 8) The length of time for 
which the services are to be performed; 9) The degree of permanence of the working 
relationship; 10) The method of payment, whether by time or by the job; and 11) 
Whether or not the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship 
may have some bearing on the question. Id. 
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for unemployment insurance through the clinic. We won. 
That replicated itself a number of times over—with workers’ 
compensation claims being the most common. The most 
notorious workers’ compensation case that I remember was of 
a driver who got assaulted by a customer and suffered 
permanent physical and mental injuries. He was one of the 
named plaintiffs in Tracy.96 
A number of the taxi drivers who came to the Employment Law 
Center’s Workers’ Rights Clinic assumed that they were owed safety-
net protections because they had worked as taxi drivers before 
companies began utilizing the “leasing” practice. 
In the late 1970s, San Francisco taxi drivers—like many drivers 
across the country—lost their access to employee protections when taxi 
companies re-ordered themselves through the practice of leasing.97 
Rather than paying taxi workers a guaranteed wage, companies began 
to ask drivers to pay to work. Drivers paid a rental fee and gasoline 
expenses for each shift, and in turn, they kept all earnings from fares 
collected. Because of the alleged lack of employer control inherent in 
the practice of leasing, taxi workers were subsequently considered to be 
“independent contractors.”98 The Teamsters, which had represented San 
Francisco taxi workers before the ascent of the leasing practice, 
challenged the status of leasing taxi workers as independent contractors 
for purposes of collective bargaining, but the courts found for the taxi 
companies under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).99 By 1979, 
taxi drivers were left without either a union or basic on-the-job 
protections.100 
Based on the broad California definition of “employee” laid out in 
Borello and many individual administrative victories, True convened a 
group of taxi workers with the intention of trying to standardize safety-
net benefits in the industry. In a case that could have been brought 
without workers under California’s consumer protections laws, True 
chose to formulate this misclassification class action through and with 
taxi worker plaintiffs.101 In many class action contexts, the named 
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plaintiffs figure in only in a symbolic capacity, with the effective 
control almost always in the hands of the attorneys.102 But as a public 
interest attorney, True—and later Christopher Ho who served as co-
counsel on the case—perceived of this litigation, from start to finish, 
not just as advancing taxi workers’ interests, but also as empowering 
taxi workers to mobilize and enact control over their work lives. True 
told me, “[W]e wanted them as a group to stand up and confront—face 
to face—management. Giving those drivers a voice was a huge thing 
for me.”103 
The problem, as True and Ho encountered it during the course of 
four years of complex litigation, was that no single “worker 
perspective” existed. In fact, divisive worker politics almost fractured 
the case. The reality was that not all workers wanted to be employees. 
And even amongst those who did, the decision to sue for safety-net 
benefits alone was met with contention. John True explained: 
We made the political decision to sue only for safety-net type 
benefits . . . not [for the drivers] to be considered employees 
generally. For example, we didn’t sue for minimum wage or 
overtime because by and large drivers did not pay taxes, and 
we didn’t want to make them vulnerable during discovery. 
Some of the drivers were mad about this.104 
Ho echoed this, “I remember the tensions between the main 
drivers. We had to decertify part of the class action because of the 
divisiveness among the class. . . . It was very painful.”105 
Despite these difficulties, even during the throes of the case, True 
and Ho met regularly with driver-plaintiffs, and together, the drivers 
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voted on all litigation decisions. Both attorneys described combative 
meetings in which they went out of their way to build consensus among 
the class. True said: 
We had so many meetings with drivers to decide what to do 
[throughout the litigation] . . . We would meet before and 
after court and settlement hearings. We met with a core group 
of thirty to forty drivers each time. These were long, 
contentious meetings where we tried to articulate the goals of 
the lawsuit and what we could accomplish. . . . Then we’d 
have more meetings with individual drivers around their 
cases. I remember thinking, ‘Why don’t we just litigate the 
way we want and stop all of these meetings?’ It occurred to 
me that it would have been easier without the drivers. But . . 
. it would have been a terrible mistake [to exclude them from 
the decision-making process] . . . I can remember half a 
dozen times when we were in court where drivers got to be 
heard and companies had to listen. They heard the B.S. the 
management said in court, and they could actually respond to 
it. . . . Giving drivers a voice was a huge thing for me, and 
part of the case that I am really proud of.106 
True’s memories underscore the remarkable lengths to which his 
team went to build consensus and maintain agency for the workers 
amidst litigation decisions. Joe Tracy, the lead plaintiff, remembered 
these meetings as well. Tracy was passionate about drivers’ rights and 
had witnessed the reality of taxi work both before and after the switch 
to leasing and independent contracting.107 
Despite the eventual victory on summary judgment, Joe Tracy was 
so exhausted by the case that he was not motivated to fight for workers’ 
rights after it ended.108 Prior to the case, Tracy had been politicized 
through his own experiences with injustice and indignity at work.109 
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out, and Mary Warner, who eventually became the president – she was 
standing right there at the door waiting for me to come out and when I came 
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These experiences had made him a leader amongst taxi-worker 
advocates, and, throughout the case, he had persisted. But afterward, 
he, like True and Ho, and the other drivers, was drained by the 
tensions among the class and the vicious lawyering of the cab 
companies. Tracy said that he felt he had done his part, “[E]ver since 
the end of this exhaustive case, I have kept my head down pretty 
much.”110 Years after the win, the new president of Luxor Cab, Tracy’s 
employer, asked Joe Tracy whether he was going to be a troublemaker. 
Tracy answered, I did my bit for my rights and the rights of my fellow 
cab drivers . . . I’m done. I’m exhausted. I’m not going to be 
advocating anymore for anybody unless somebody messes with me in 
particular, so don’t mess with me. Leave me alone.111 
Tracy was no doubt an extraordinary win for taxi workers. But 
despite the best efforts of the public interest attorneys to maintain 
worker agency through the process, the case complicated both the 
possibilities of misclassification litigation and the aspiration to leverage 
litigation victories to empower workers towards mobilization. The 
length of the litigation, due in large part to the vigorous and well-
financed lawyering of the taxi companies, exhausted workers like Tracy 
who missed work and forfeited pay to participate.112 Rather than 
mobilizing the collective power of workers, the difficulties of the case 
diverted the energies of potential leaders. As True aptly reflected over 
 
out, she started waving her finger right in my face and yelling at me about 
how ‘you drivers, [this and that],’ you know, I was just saying the 
bathroom out there is just too bad, I couldn’t use it. And she kept yelling at 
me and sort of blaming me for all of this. And I just kind of ducked my 
head and crawled out of there as she was, you know, yelling at me all the 
way out of the building. And over the next three days, I went from a slow 
simmer about that to a rolling boil. I was completely pissed, and I would 
always think back to how my mother taught us three kids to always be nice 
to everybody, but don’t take any crap from anybody. That was in my genes. 
Interview with Joe Tracy, Cab Driver, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 8, 2013). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
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with me, because I still go the Irish-German in me, you know. 
Id. 
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two decades later, “I’m not sure if the lawsuit prevented further 
mobilizing . . . that’s an issue that pervades employment law.”113 
 
Image 3: Joe Tracy in his home in San Francisco in 2010. In recounting his role in the 
misclassification litigation, he told me, “[T]here was so much anxiety and pressure and 
worry about whether it was going to be a win or a loss, you know, so that just 
thoroughly exhausted me after—even after we won, it was like that’s it, you know, now 
I’m going to go live my happy life.”114 
2. LONG TERM IMPACTS OF TRACY: RIGHTS WITHOUT POWER 
Despite the unintentional consequences of Tracy on long term taxi 
worker organizing and mobilization, the decision undeniably aided 
vulnerable workers in the immediate aftermath of the decision. As 
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Christopher Ho explained to the media after the win, “You have these 
horror stories of [drivers] getting clubbed over the head, pinned 
between cabs, and going to S.F. General [Hospital] . . . The gross 
injustice of this is that cabbies [would] get injured on the job and the 
company [would] fight them tooth and nail [in workers’ compensation 
claims].”115 Tracy legally ensured that taxi workers were “employees” 
for purposes of unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation.116 
In what OSHA considers one of the most dangerous industries in the 
nation, workers finally had a safety-net to fall back upon if they were 
injured and lost their job. In my research, however, conducted many 
years after the Tracy decision, few drivers knew of the right to 
workers’ compensation, and those who did know were afraid to use the 
right. No one but older worker advocates who had labored in the 
industry when Tracy was decided knew about their right to 
unemployment insurance. And Yellow Cab had attempted to reinstate 
their security deposit requirement at least twice.  
Many taxi workers in my research who were aware of their right 
to workers’ compensation stated that in the case of an injury, they 
would not file a claim. One worker leaned in and whispered to me 
during our interview, “They [the taxi cab companies] blacklist you. I 
had a friend who filed. I know. He never worked in the industry 
again.”117 Another driver said, “I was giving a driver a ride to work, 
and he said he got rear ended and he said the cab company told him if 
you get an attorney and apply for workers’ comp, you’re going to lose 
your shifts and he didn’t, so he just lived with his injury.”118 Whether 
or not the rumors of “black-listing” taxi workers and discouraging them 
from filing workers’ compensation were true, they speak to the relative 
powerlessness of the taxi worker in enforcing what, through the 
strenuous litigation in Tracy v. Yellow Cab, became his “right.” The 
workers feared that if they did file for workers’ compensation, after 
their recovery, they would never find work in the industry again.  
Unlike with workers’ compensation, only two workers in my 
research (both of whom were tangentially involved in Tracy) knew 
about the right to unemployment insurance. Even Paul Gillespie, a 
longtime taxi driver who served for many years on San Francisco’s 
Taxi Commission, had never heard that workers had won the right to 
 
 115. Cook, supra note 85, at 25. 
 116. Tracy v. Yellow Cab Coop., No. 938786, slip op. at 2 (Super. Ct. Cal. 
Feb. 10, 1997). 
 117. See supra note 29. 
 118. Id. 
768 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
file for unemployment.119 It was unclear whether this was because cab 
companies had effectively stamped out the knowledge by discouraging 
such claims or whether the information had been lost to time. My 
research also uncovered that at Luxor Cab in 2012, the one 
unemployment insurance claim that had been filed had been rejected by 
the EDD (Employment Development Department), despite the Tracy 
decision. While this decision was not published and neither Luxor’s 
attorneys nor management would share why the claim was rejected, my 
conjecture is that the more recent restructuring of taxi firms—through 
the rise of long-term leasing and the decline of day-leasing—led the 
administrative body to determine that Luxor taxi workers were now 
“independent contractors” and no longer “employees,” as they had 
been at the time of the Tracy litigation. 
Though both unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation 
have dwindled as enforced rights for cab drivers, San Francisco taxi 
workers did use collective power to mobilize the one remaining “win” 
in Tracy: the prohibition against cash bonds or security deposits.120 
Twice, in both 2008 and 2010, Yellow Cab issued notices to drivers to 
“pre-pay” monthly for their shifts.121 Yellow Cab drivers were told that 
management had changed the terms of the contract, illustrating the one-
sided nature of these contracts, and warned that if drivers did not 
prepay for the entire month, they would lose their assigned shifts. The 
United Taxicab Workers (UTW)—a driver-led workers’ rights 
organization—mobilized workers, informing them that this was illegal 
under Tracy.122 Bud Hazelkorn, then president of UTW, threatened a 
lawsuit seeking injunctive relief.123 Quietly, weeks later, Yellow Cab 
notices about the pre-payment were taken down, and drivers informed 
that the change had been “postponed.”124 
The conundrum of Tracy reflects the larger problem with effecting 
individual employee rights for workers in a “grey zone.” Unlike the 
right to collectively bargain under the NLRA, individual employee 
rights and litigation attempting to enforce those rights do not address 
the inequalities integral to the contractual theory of employment. In the 
case of Tracy, policing individual employee rights through litigation 
after the formation of the contract between worker and employer did 
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not destabilize the employer’s dominant position. While taxi workers 
were granted individual protections, the asymmetry of power between 
them and the cab companies was left untouched. The structural power 
of capital won over a hard-fought for legal decision. And perhaps 
worse, the outrage and energy of the lead plaintiff waned. 
 
Illustration 4: United Taxicab Workers flier from 2010, urging drivers not to prepay for 
their shifts and informing them of the ruling in Tracy v. Yellow Cab. 
A. Friendly Cab v. NLRB 
Analytically, the next case study leaves off where Tracy ended. 
The key reason that Tracy did not have a long-term impact on the lives 
of taxi workers was drivers’ limited power to leverage the hard-won 
safety-net protections. But what might have happened if the taxi 
workers had been employees not just for one-off rights but under 
National Labor Relations Act—that is, if they had the legally-enforced 
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power to collectively bargain with their employers? Would 
misclassification litigation in the NLRA context have been more 
effective? 
In analyzing Friendly Cab v. NLRB, I examine the pre- and post-
litigation realities of a taxi worker mobilization across the bay from San 
Francisco—in Oakland. After years of organizing, protesting, and 
holding improbable work stoppages, these taxi workers petitioned for 
employee recognition for unionizing purposes. As in San Francisco, the 
taxicab company employers structured their work through the practice 
of leasing to avoid liabilities associated with employment; but at each 
level of appeal, the courts found that the drivers were indeed 
employees. The Ninth Circuit opined that despite the leasing practice, 
the employers exerted unusual control over the means and manner of 
the work and that the taxi drivers had limited entrepreneurial 
opportunities.125 
And yet, despite the fact that the appellate court found that these 
taxi workers had the right to collectively bargain and recognized them 
as a bargaining unit, no union contract was ever established. In fact, 
workers never even made it to the bargaining table to hash out the 
terms of their work contracts. The real-life hindrances faced by 
workers in Friendly Cab were two-fold. First, despite years of worker 
organizing and the legal recognition of their bargaining unit, the taxi 
drivers still languished under the incredible structural and political 
power of their employers. Second, surprisingly, the taxi workers never 
really wanted to be employees. Their primary goal was cooperative 
self-ownership, but this objective was never embraced either by city 
regulators or by the union that supported them through the litigation. 
1. BEFORE THE LITIGATION: ORGANIZING FOR SELF-OWNERSHIP 
A battle that began with worker protests in 1996 and culminated in 
a Ninth Circuit decision finding workers to have been misclassified 
under the NLRA appeared to be a perfect success story of collective 
bargaining laws in the United States. The story leading up to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Friendly Cab is remarkable—involving almost a 
decade of resistance by low-income immigrant workers, including 
refugees from Afghanistan and immigrants from Nigeria and India. 
Many of the taxi workers in Oakland, California who worked for the 
multiple taxi companies operated by a single family entered the 
business because of both the relative freedom allotted to them by the 
leasing practice and because, despite their professional status in their 
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home country, they were carved out of similar work here. Their work 
lives as Oakland-based taxi drivers, however, were both precarious and 
oppressive. In addition to their low earnings, drivers complained of the 
frequent and unpredictable disciplinary actions taken by their employers 
(mostly in the form of fines) and the degree of capricious control 
exerted upon them while at work. 
Responding to these conditions in 1996, almost one hundred 
drivers held days-long protests, seeking municipal recognition of their 
enumerated grievances.126 Conceiving of themselves as a “union,” they 
complained to Oakland’s public safety committee that their cab 
companies refused to take basic measures to keep them safe, despite 
legal regulations mandating certain protections. For example, some of 
the companies would not install protective shields in their taxis, as 
required by law. Drivers also raised serious concerns about “faulty 
brakes, shoddy repairs, and lack of insurance for drivers.”127 Their 
concerns—about both worker and consumer safety—fell on mostly deaf 
ears. The Singh family—who owned several taxi cab companies in 
Oakland, including the three largest—were powerful lobbyists who, 
drivers told me, had many friends in city government.128 
By late 2001, during the national drop in tourism following the 
September 11th attacks, these Oakland-based taxi drivers were 
earning—on average—$25,000 a year, hardly enough to support their 
families in one of the most expensive areas in the world.129 Their dire 
economic situation led to a new round of mobilizing. Anwar Zadran, a 
refugee from Afghanistan who had worked for Friendly Cab since the 
early 1990s, emerged as a worker leader. Leveraging his charismatic 
personality, reputation for honesty, and boundless energy, Zadran 
organized over one hundred taxi workers into an association called the 
East Bay Drivers’ Association (EBDA). Reflecting on this feat years 
later, Zadran said: 
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We were mostly from our different countries. They [the cab 
companies] were trying to take advantage of us because we 
didn’t know the law. They charged us fines when we say 
anything [in opposition] to them. We also needed vacation 
time and sick time [to deal] with the rest of our problems. 
That was one of the reasons that I gathered the drivers 
together to be unionized.130 
Like Zadran, members of the EBDA were frustrated by the degree 
of control exerted over their work lives by both the cab companies and 
the city regulators. The drivers’ complaints against the city were two-
fold. First, they alleged that the city did not provide them with an 
adequate number of taxi stands to pick up fares. The existing stands 
were always busy, and drivers who tried to hustle in other parts of the 
city—in parking places or at the curb—were slapped with tickets by the 
police department. These tickets often cost them more than half a day’s 
income.131 Second, the drivers wanted the city to issue taxi medallions 
to working drivers—instead of to owners of existing taxi companies. 
The drivers wanted more control over their personal and professional 
lives. This supposed freedom and flexibility of taxi work had been a 
primary reason many of them had become drivers in the first place. 
The drivers’ complaints against the companies they worked for 
were many, but most stemmed from exploitation and unusually high 
degree of control exerted by the cab companies. The Singhs owned 
nearly sixty percent of Oakland’s medallions or taxi permits. Among 
other things, drivers complained that the companies operated by this 
family compelled them to sign blank contracts that were later filled out 
by the company, that they charged higher leases to drivers who 
complained, and that they gave the best taxis and lower rates to Indian 
immigrant drivers (the Singhs are originally from India).132 They also 
alleged that the family “force[d] drivers to pay exorbitant repair bills in 
violation of their contracts, skim[med] off percentages of voucher 
reimbursements that belong to [the] drivers, fail[ed] to insure cabs and 
force[d] drivers to use cabs that [were] ‘battered and non-roadworthy, 
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lack heating and air-conditioning, or belch smog.’”133 Drivers who 
complained, they said, were either disciplined or terminated.134 
Since their drivers’ complaints were directed both at Oakland city 
officials and the cab company owners, the EBDA’s organizing occurred 
along two tracks simultaneously. Workers both pushed the city to give 
them more control over their lives and pressured the cab companies to 
do the same. The drivers, represented by Berkeley attorney Donald 
Jelinek, sued the five affiliated taxi companies then operated by the 
Singhs for extortion, fraud, race discrimination, and retaliation.135 For 
confidential reasons, the drivers eventually took on the case pro per and 
the litigation was later dismissed.136 
However, in the process, Jelinek referred the EBDA to the 
Teamsters Local 7 for representation. The Teamsters, excited to have 
found a group of organized drivers to represent, closely examined the 
work realities imposed by the cab companies. Though the Teamsters 
had failed to establish employee status in other independent contracting 
contexts (mainly trucking) given the high degree of control exerted by 
the Singhs, they were hopeful for a better outcome with the EBDA.137 
As the Teamsters advanced their asks of the taxicab companies, the 
EBDA also heavily lobbied city officials to give them medallions or 
permits to operate their own taxi business. Zadran and other drivers 
explained to me that their dream had been to establish a worker-run taxi 
company. The taxi company they envisioned was a worker-cooperative 
in which the members of the EBDA shared both revenue and power. 
They believed that through self-ownership, they could better realize the 
demands of their non-work lives while also having a say in how they 
conducted themselves at work. Many of the immigrant men in the 
EBDA shared close friendships and bonds that they hoped would serve 
them well in a cooperative context. The most pressing question for 
them was how to get the medallions. The drivers believed that the 
Singhs were in violation of the terms of use for some of their 
medallions, and they lobbied the city to take those permits back and re-
issue them to workers. Despite much advocacy by EBDA leaders—
some of which I participated in—the city never relinquished. Behind 
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closed doors, sympathetic city officials explained to the drivers that the 
political capital of the Singh family tied their hands. 
2. LITIGATION FOR EMPLOYEE STATUS: GETTING FRIENDLY CAB TO 
THE BARGAINING TABLE 
In 2002, at the same time that the EBDA sued Friendly Cab in 
state court for various civil wrongs, they also—with the assistance of 
the Teamsters Local 70—petitioned the NLRB to be certified as a 
bargaining unit.138 While the drivers continued to seek their own 
medallions, both the city and the Teamsters urged the drivers down the 
path of “employee status” to get the Singhs to bargain with them. When 
asked whether he knew that the drivers’ original goal had been to get 
medallions to start their own business, Bob Aiello, the Teamster’s 
Business Agent who worked with the EBDA over many years, 
admitted: 
Yes, oh yeah, they saw the value of the medallions and they 
wanted their own. But then they would really become 
independent contractors and that wasn’t our objective. My 
objective was that they were not independent contractors, but 
[that] they were employees of Friendly Cab. They [the 
company owners] were blackmailing them and abusing them. 
My position, well, Local 70’s position, was that we wanted to 
stop the abuse and negotiate a fair collective bargaining 
agreement that would give them rights and security and 
retirement benefits.139 
The Teamsters’ objectives reflected the traditional path to address 
worker grievances: get workers under the employee umbrella, help 
them achieve bargaining rights, negotiate a fair contract, and increase 
collective worker power through union membership. Local 70 wanted 
to give the taxi workers in Oakland the kind of employee life that union 
officials knew was safe and secure. City regulators felt similarly. Once 
the EBDA was legally considered a union, the city could continue to 
work with known actors—the existing cab company owners—but their 
regulatory load would be significantly lightened. The welfare of the taxi 
workers would be addressed through private negotiations with the 
collective bargaining unit, rather than in and through public hearings. 
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Both city regulators and the Teamsters were encouraged by the 
fact that on the face of things, the Singh family treated the drivers like 
employees. According to both the workers and their attorneys, the 
Singhs—unlike many taxicab companies whose business model relied 
on the practice of long-term leasing—exerted an unusual amount of 
control over the daily work lives of the taxi drivers. In the course of 
my research, I found that in San Francisco, many drivers opted into the 
long-term leasing practice because they typically only had to go into the 
taxi company garages upon occasion to pay a fixed rate to the cab 
company. All fares were then typically collected without accounting to 
the employer. The workers were otherwise free to work as they 
pleased—picking up fares on their own terms and in their own time. If 
they needed to stop driving to pick their child up from school, or to get 
coffee, then that was their prerogative. Since the 1970s, when the 
leasing and long-term leasing practices began to proliferate in taxi 
companies across the country, courts repeatedly found that the practice 
created a “strong inference” that taxi companies were not exerting 
control over the “means and manner” of the workers’ performance, and 
that consequently, the drivers were independent contractors, 
unprotected by labor and employment laws.140 
However, the long-term leasing practice at the Singhs’ 
establishments did not work in this way. Taxi driver plaintiffs relayed 
that the Singhs’ “flat rate” was not flat at all—but differed amongst 
workers. If the owners liked the driver, he got a lower rate. Drivers 
were not allowed to develop their own clientele and could only take 
fares from the company dispatcher. The owners also exerted a 
significant degree of control in regulating the manner in which the 
drivers drove—requiring drivers to adhere to a dress code, mandating 
that they accept “vouchers,” charging them “processing fees,” and 
requiring that they carry advertisements on their vehicles from which 
they earned no revenue. The owners even deployed a “road manager” 
who monitored drivers while they were working. The drivers also had 
to pay for accidents and maintenance and adhere to a training manual 
that outlined requirements above and beyond those outlined in city 
regulations. In the NLRB hearings, drivers testified that any verbal 
disagreements with the cab company owners or managers would lead to 
additional fines. 
Based on these facts, and more, in 2002, the NLRB regional 
director found the drivers to be statutory employees and directed a 
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union election.141 But the owners of the cab companies were 
immediately recalcitrant, claiming that the drivers were independent 
contractors by law.142 They appealed to a three-member NLRB panel. 
On review, the drivers won, and once again, the cab companies 
appealed.143 As the case went through the lengthy appeals process, the 
drivers continued their mobilization towards self-ownership. In 2006, 
amidst worker advocacy and lobbying of city regulators to issue 
medallions to them, the city council affirmed their support for the 
collective bargaining path. The Oakland City Council passed a 
resolution “[e]ncouraging [f]air [b]argaining and [e]mployee 
[r]ecognition for Oakland’s [t]axi [d]rivers,”144 while continuing their 
refusal to issue even a single medallion to EBDA advocates.145 
The Singhs appealed Friendly Cab until it reached the Ninth 
Circuit.146 Finally, in 2008, the appellate court found that the workers 
at these cab companies organized under the East Bay Drivers’ 
Association were, in fact, employees.147 In a strongly-worded opinion, 
the court affirmed that:  
[A] number of factors . . . in their totality compel a finding of 
employee status, the most significant of these being Friendly's 
prohibition on its drivers’ operating an independent business 
and developing entrepreneurial opportunities with customers. 
Additional salient indicia of control by Friendly over the 
means and manner of its drivers’ performance include: (1) 
regulating the details of how drivers must operate their 
taxicabs; (2) imposing discipline for refusing or delays in 
responding to dispatches; (3) requiring drivers to carry 
advertisements without receiving revenue; (4) requiring 
drivers to accept vouchers subject to graduated “processing 
fees;” (5) prohibiting subleases; (6) imposing a strict dress 
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code; and (7) requiring training in excess of government 
regulations. 148 
After twelve years of organizing and six years of litigation, the EBDA 
drivers finally had the right to collectively bargain.  
 
Illustration 7: East Bay Drivers’ Association members after the NLRB found in 2004 
that drivers were employees of a syndicate of taxi cab companies in Oakland. Anwar 
Zadran, voted by the EBDA drivers as their leader and representative, is in front.149 
3. FRIENDLY CAB’S EXTRALEGAL VICTORIES 
The day that the Ninth Circuit decision came down, in January 
2008, the Teamsters press release quoted the EBDA leader, Anwar 
Zadran, as saying, “We now have the voice and the power with the 
company to receive better benefits and working conditions. This has 
been a long time coming.”150 In the same press release, James P. Hoffa, 
the Teamsters General President, reflected on the ramifications of this 
case on the broader fight against misclassification: 
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Companies are now on notice that they cannot skirt the law by 
misclassifying their employees as independent contractors, a 
system that penalizes workers. From big companies like 
FedEx to smaller ones like Friendly Cab, the Teamsters are 
working nationwide to make sure this illegal business practice 
is erased.151 
It seemed like a dream success story—after many, many years of 
organizing, appeal after appeal, the underdog workers had won. They 
could finally engage in negotiations with the employer. 
But that negotiation never happened. Pushing back against the 
decision, the company used their significant structural and political 
power to resist compliance. As Bob Aiello from Local 70 told me, “In 
2008 [after the decision], we tried to get the employers to the 
bargaining table, and they kept stonewalling us. They did everything in 
their power to not bargain in good faith. This went on and on and 
on.”152 Zadran echoed this, “It took a long time, and it didn’t help. The 
company has the money.”153 
Friendly Cab’s defiance of the Ninth Circuit decision, however, 
was only one problem. Both union representatives and drivers attested 
to the gradual atrophy of organizing energy among EBDA members 
through the many years of litigation. Many EBDA members had lost 
faith in the efficacy of the union after more than half a decade of 
waiting for enforcement with no result. For those drivers, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision did not appear any different than the previous ones, 
which had been ineffective. Aiello reflected on that time and the 
struggles he faced with keeping drivers engaged: 
After working with the Friendly Cab drivers for some time, I 
set up a council [of workers], and we had an election. The 
council consisted of four members who were the leaders of 
the group. If there were issues, they would be brought to the 
council, and if it wasn’t rectified through the council, then, 
the council would bring it to me, and I would get involved. . . 
. This went on for a period of time; the folks were paying us 
$25 per month individually. By the time the decision came 
down, most of them had stopped paying. Because it was a 
slow process. They thought I would have it wrapped up in a 
nice package in a short period of time. I tried to maintain the 
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council and hold things together even though they stopped 
paying [the $25 monthly fees]. But it was impossible. I had so 
much other work to do. (emphasis added).154 
Finally, in 2009, without union dues coming in and facing an 
intransigent employer, Teamsters Local 70 let go of their 
representation. Bob Aiello described a meeting he had with the 
President of Teamsters Joint Council 7, Chuck Mack, in which the 
decision was made: 
Because of the expense and all the attorneys’ fees, my wages, 
and everything, Chuck decided to withdraw our 
representation. We won the battle, but not the war because we 
didn’t achieve the collective bargaining. Chuck thought it was 
a good fight, and that case set precedent. But in our situation 
here, we could no longer afford to represent them.155 
(emphasis added) 
Though the union gave up on them, the EBDA drivers did not give 
up on their hopes for self-ownership. In April 2009, after thirteen long 
years of organizing, the taxi drivers took to the streets again—this time 
without union support. They gathered outside City Hall and held a two-
day work stoppage, protesting the Singh’s noncompliance with the 
Friendly Cab decision and the city’s refusal to issue them medallions. 
During this strike, the Singhs finally took extra-legal action. They 
towed the leased taxis from in front of the homes of the EBDA leaders. 
The drivers sued for retaliation and eventually settled with the Singhs, 
but the workers’ leaders did not get their jobs back. 
In 2014, I ran into Zadran at a protest in front of Uber’s 
headquarters. After losing his job as a taxi driver in Oakland and failing 
to get a medallion to start his own company, he was driving for Uber. I 
asked Zadran if he was going to start unionizing Uber drivers, and he 
laughed with the same optimism I remembered from years before. But 
when I reached out to him again two years later, in 2016, he was 
downtrodden. Uber had dropped their rates dramatically, and Zadran’s 
ability to support his family was diminished. He had been working 
tirelessly, sixteen hours a day, seven days a week. I asked if he was 
still going to protests or involved in any organizing efforts of Uber 
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drivers. He let out a resigned sigh, and with frustration in his voice, 
said: 
It takes a long time. And it doesn’t help. They have the 
money. Plus it’s not worth it. What am I going to get for it? 
The union, they are supposed to win the case and get the 
company to bargain. Local 70 said they would form the 
union, but they give up. It’s very hard to become unionized. I 
failed in doing it for just 100 drivers. How can I do it with 
these thousands of Uber drivers? And what for?156 
Although the Teamsters representative did not regret the time and 
energy they put into the case, Zadran did. Economically, physically, 
and emotionally, he was worse off than he had been prior to the NLRB 
mobilization. And like Joe Tracy, his optimism about law and 
organizing had waned. 
B. Alexander v. FedEx 
The last case study in this Article is perhaps the most important 
when examining the labor implications of platform-enabled gig 
companies and devising ways to address worker insecurity. Fed-Ex is 
the “largest and most successful global transportation company in the 
world,” and like today’s biggest on-demand platforms, including Uber, 
Fed-Ex was built on a strategy of deregulation, industry disruption, and 
risk-shift.157 As Beth Ross, the lead plaintiffs’ attorney in multi-state 
misclassification litigation against FedEx noted in reference to the 
growth of the gig economy, “In many ways, FedEx legitimized this 
conversation about how everyone has a right to be an independent 
contractor.”158 
In this section, I tell the remarkable story of FedEx, its use of 
political influence to facilitate deregulation, and the fierce multi-district 
litigation that challenged their use of independent contractors. Based on 
interviews with both plaintiffs’ attorneys and plaintiff-workers involved 
in two related cases—Estrada v. FedEx159 and Alexander v. FedEx—I 
describe how the misclassification litigation victories impacted workers’ 
lives. 
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1. FEDEX’S INDUSTRY DISRUPTION: DEREGULATION AND 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING 
As scholars have shown, FedEx is a “well-known corporate 
success story,”160 netting billions of dollars within a few years of its 
founding. FedEx first became a leading player in the air-cargo delivery 
business, which, prior to FedEx’s work to deregulate the industry, had 
been highly regulated and unprofitable. In pushing for and establishing 
a favorable regulatory environment, within ten years, FedEx became 
more profitable than its larger and older competitor: UPS.161 In 2000, 
when FedEx entered the market for ground delivery, the company once 
again took its competitors by storm, employing an independent 
contractor business model, growing rapidly, and usurping nearly fifty 
percent of the market within a decade.162 
FedEx’s success has largely been attributed to its political 
participation in a series of major regulatory reforms.163 Over many 
decades, FedEx leveraged its significant power in the form of both 
political and structural capital to achieve a regulatory environment 
favorable to the company’s visions. For example, the federal act 
liberalizing the air cargo industry—passed in 1977—was commonly 
referred to in Congress as “The Federal Express Act” and principally 
designed to benefit FedEx.164 The deregulation of inter- and intrastate 
trucking in the 1980s and 1990s, via the Motor Carrier Act of 1980165 
and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act in 1995,166 
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was also in large part the result of FedEx’s industry disruption and 
political mobilization efforts, well detailed in Jill Fisch’s 2005 study of 
the company.167 
For this case study, I look at FedEx’s expansion into ground 
transportation and its practice of using independent contractor truck 
drivers. In 2000, FedEx purchased and grew a company—Roadway 
Package Systems (RPS)—that had, since 1985, also utilized a business 
model built on deregulation.168 For fifteen years, RPS had ground-
shipped packages with a workforce of independent contractor drivers.169 
Although RPS has faced years of costly misclassification litigation, 
upon purchase, FedEx chose to adopt an independent contractor model 
and expand it. 
In RPS, FedEx found a kindred business spirit. Several RPS 
founders were former UPS managers “who were confident they could 
successfully compete with UPS with innovative business methods and 
an entirely different business model.”170 To compete against UPS—
whose workers are represented by Teamsters—RPS cut their labor 
costs, thus enabling them to lower their shipping prices. Instead of 
investing in a workforce—purchasing a fleet of delivery trucks, hiring 
mechanics to maintain those trucks, and employing truck drivers—RPS 
foisted all of those responsibilities onto independent contractors.171 
Meanwhile, these “small business owners” were promised the freedom 
and flexibility of operating their “own businesses.”172 Just as today’s 
on-demand labor platform companies claim to merely be “tech 
companies” that cyber coordinate workers and consumers, RPS—and 
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later FedEx—claimed to not be an employer, but a conduit between 
those who wanted to ship and those who could make the delivery. 
RPS did eventually gain a competitive advantage over UPS by 
eliminating from its operating budget employment taxes, workers’ 
compensation liability, and the costs and liabilities associated with 
owning and operating a fleet.173 Still, to build their brand, the company 
needed to exert some control over their workers—especially with regard 
to the appearance of both their trucks and their drivers. The RPS 
drivers were required to sign Operating Agreements which obligated 
them to purchase or lease trucks through a specific company—Bush 
Leasing—and “to pay all expenses associated with operating that 
equipment and performing their assigned work duties.”174 RPS assigned 
to each driver a geographically defined service route “to which, 
according to [the] Operating Agreement, they had a proprietary 
interest.”175 RPS, however, exerted substantial control over how that 
proprietary right could be exercised.176 177 
The artful crafting of their truck drivers as independent contractors 
led to many legal challenges. RPS’s independent contractor business 
model was first challenged by the Teamsters in the late 1980s.178 In 
1988, the NLRB decided that since RPS required their drivers to lease 
their trucks from a particular vendor (Bush Leasing), the company 
exerted enough control over their workers to consider them employees 
for purposes of collective bargaining.179 The IRS went after the 
company after realizing they could get back-taxes for 
misclassification.180 In 1994, RPS re-wrote their contract, allowing 
Bush Leasing to fall out of the contract, and including language to the 
effect of “no one can tell you when to take your break or how to 
conduct your business.”181 RPS paid 25 million dollars for a letter of 
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assurance from the IRS saying that under the 1994 contract, RPS truck 
drivers were independent contractors under tax laws.182  
After FedEx purchased RPS in 1998, it launched FedEx Home 
Delivery, a business-to-consumer service.183 In operating the company 
as a turnkey operation, FedEx inherited both the business model and 
the company’s legal troubles.184 Over the next two decades, FedEx 
“steadfastly stood by and defended the independent contractor model in 
every conceivable state and federal legal forum, including a group of 
class action cases filed between 2004 and 2009, asserting various 
statutory and common law claims under the laws of over 40 states as 
well as federal claims arising under the FLSA [Fair Labor Standards 
Act], ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act], and the 
FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act].”185 This litigation and 
FedEx’s commitment to operating in a deregulated and de-unionized 
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workplace led them to pay over one billion dollars of litigation costs 
(including settlements) by 2016.186 
2. IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT: BEING A FEDEX INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR 
The independent contractor business no doubt enabled FedEx’s 
successful and growing share in the ground delivery service market. 
But the implications for workers were less positive. Many drivers who 
began working for FedEx during this time did not understand what it 
meant to be an independent contractor when they purchased and worked 
a FedEx route. As Dale Rose, a named plaintiff in two important 
misclassification cases against FedEx, told me: 
I didn’t have a firm grasp of the difference between an 
independent contractor and an employee. I bought what they 
[FedEx] sold. They said, “This is your potential income.” 
They sold that to me really hard. They sold it as “You have 
control over your life; it’s your truck; it’s your business, and 
you’ll have a lot of control.” Which obviously I didn’t want 
to turn away.187 
Like the taxi worker plaintiffs in Tracy and Friendly Cab, control 
over their work lives was enticing to many FedEx drivers. The idea 
that they could be small business people—growing their own company, 
not having a boss on their back, and having the freedom to take time 
off to care for family—these were reasons that many workers, including 
Rose, were attracted to FedEx. 
But soon after investing tens of thousands of dollars in a truck and 
a route, many drivers discovered that this “control” was illusory. 
Plaintiff-worker Marjorie Pontarolo, for example, bought a truck and a 
route from FedEx in 1999, just a year after the company was purchased 
from RPS. Reflecting on those early years driving and delivering for 
FedEx, Pontarolo said: 
They called us independent contractors, but basically, they 
controlled us. They told us what uniforms to wear, what times 
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we could be at certain places. . . . As the years progressed, 
they really started tightening down, “You can’t wear black 
socks, you have to wear white socks, you can’t do this and 
you can do this.” And they really started tightening down on 
different parts of the job: what to do, where to be, how to do 
it, how to dress, when you could leave, when you could come 
back. . . . If you made mistakes, for example, or had an 
accident or if you missed your pick up, what they started 
doing was charging you.188 
Drivers like Rose and Pontarolo were disgruntled—and looking for 
solutions to their grievances against FedEx. Rose formed an informal 
group among contractors in his terminal in Southern California. Drivers 
met at each other’s homes, and for months, discussed their on-the-job 
complaints. Rose recalled: 
We talked about what’s frustrating and about what FedEx 
really needed to address and we put it down on paper and 
presented it to higher management. . . . He pretended to take 
us serious, but no actions were taken over those several 
months. And I think the people in our group were frustrated. 
Or they were afraid they were going to be retaliated against, 
and some kind of were. We tried, but we disbanded.189 
His problems unsolved, Rose went online, and like many atomized 
workers with collective action problems do, he looked to lawyers. Rose 
happened upon a website of a law firm looking for plaintiffs to sue 
FedEx for misclassification, and he signed up. 
However, the goals of the litigation that Rose and other FedEx 
drivers joined as plaintiffs did not reflect their desires. Rose did not 
want employee status. His goal was to remain an independent 
contractor but with “better pay and less control.”190 Rose told me, “I 
wanted to be a contractor who was able to provide his employees a 
decent living wage, especially for the state of California.”191 Pontarolo, 
too, articulated how she had hoped that the litigation would bring her 
the dignity and freedom that she lacked at work. But she wanted to 
maintain her status as an independent contractor and force FedEx to 
treat her like a real businessperson. Pontarolo said: 
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I was hoping that FedEx would treat us like real independent 
contractors as opposed to treating us like employees because 
everything fell on us. Anytime there was a mistake or if a 
package wasn’t delivered, they would bring us in for what 
they called a business meeting and write us up . . . and then 
they’d charge for the accident. It got to the point where it is 
was $500 a month for three months for one accident. I wanted 
them to back off and let us be real contractors. . . . The 
people that went out there and delivered the packages and did 
all the hard work and serviced their vehicles—dependable 
people out there doing a good job made FedEx what they are 
today. FedEx Ground didn’t make themselves. We did it, and 
it was upsetting to see them treating everyone like they did. I 
think if you’re going to have somebody as an independent 
contractor, then treat them like an independent contractor and 
let them do their job.192 
Though many drivers stayed in the shadows, fearful of retaliation, 
driver plaintiffs like Pontarolo and Rose stepped forward, and with the 
help and dedication of skilled plaintiffs’ attorneys, used 
misclassification litigation to challenge the degree of control exerted 
over their work lives. Importantly, however, because of the constraints 
of work law and the independent contractor-employee dichotomy, the 
misclassification litigation did not accurately capture their self-visions. 
They did not want a court to find them to be misclassified employees, 
rather, they wanted legal recognition of their status as mistreated 
independent contractors. 
3. ESTRADA & ALEXANDER: WHEN WORKERS WIN IN COURT 
By the early 2000s, plaintiffs’ attorneys across the United States 
were considering misclassification litigation against FedEx under wage-
related state laws. The test for employee status varies from statute to 
statute with some state laws offering more expansive definitions of 
employment. This multi-state litigation, attorneys postulated, would 
force FedEx to change their business model nationwide and assume 
some of the traditional risk associated with employing so many 
workers. 
The first of the court cases to go to trial was Estrada v. FedEx 
Ground Package Systems, Inc.,193 which had been filed in 2000, just 
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two years after FedEx purchased RPS.194 The plaintiffs’ primary claim 
in Estrada was for reimbursement of employment-related expenses 
under California Labor Code § 2802.195 Over the course of nine years 
of complex litigation, a large class of workers was certified, and the 
drivers were held to be employees under the California Borello 
standard—the same test for employee status used in the Tracy, 
decision.196 Substantial damages were awarded to each class member.197 
Though FedEx appealed the decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the trial court’s finding, pointing to the Operating Agreement which the 
drivers had to sign, the FedEx “Ground Manual,” and the “Operations 
Management Handbook.”198 The appellate decision delineated the many 
ways in which the drivers are “totally integrated into the [FedEx] 
operation,” including “that they perform work essential to FedEx’s 
core business, that they are required to work exclusively and full-time 
for FedEx, that their customers are those assigned to them by FedEx, 
that no specialized skills are required, that they must wear uniforms and 
conform absolutely to FedEx’s standards and that, in the end, each 
driver has a ‘job’ with ‘little or no entrepreneurial opportunities.”199 
The court took special note of the fact that FedEx controlled “every 
exquisite detail of the drivers’ performance, including the color of their 
socks and the style of their hair.”200 In finding the single work area 
drivers to be employees for reimbursement purposes (excluding the cost 
of their vehicles), the trial court wrote, “[I]f it looks like a duck, walks 
like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck.”201 
While Estrada was still winding its way through the court system, 
over forty more misclassification class actions cases were filed by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys on behalf of FedEx drivers under state laws all over 
the country.202 All the class action lawsuits posed the identical legal 
question: are FedEx ground drivers employees, or are they independent 
contractors? Although virtually all the cases plead state law violations, 
at FedEx’s behest, these cases were consolidated into a multi-district 
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litigation docket and all pretrial proceedings were put before a judge in 
the Northern District of Indiana.203 
When Estrada was decided, many commentators understood it as 
having a potentially far-reaching consequence for FedEx drivers, but 
instead of abiding by the spirit of the decision and paying their drivers 
as employees, FedEx responded to Estrada by eliminating their single-
route contracts.204 In late 2007, the company shifted all their California 
work to the “multi-work area” business model.205 Many single-route 
drivers were forced to purchase other routes and more than 1,000 
single route drivers were not renewed.206 FedEx acknowledged that this 
action was taken in response to the Estrada decision.207 
How did this change impact the plaintiffs? As one of the attorneys 
for the plaintiffs said, “a lot [of drivers] lost their jobs, which I feel 
extremely guilty about.”208 Pontarolo reflected: 
After Estrada, you had to have multiple work areas . . . the 
stress factor went up and it made it harder. Over a period of 
time, it just kept getting worse and worse. . . . Everything 
that FedEx was doing to cover themselves against any of us 
being employees made our lives very hard. Everything was at 
our expense. They didn’t care. It was like, ‘You need to go 
out and service your area, and we don’t care if you take lunch 
breaks, we don’t care what you have to do to do it.’ 209 
Thus, while FedEx did treat their workers more like independent 
contractors, as many drivers had hoped, how they made this change 
was surprising and challenging for both workers and their attorneys. In 
addition to many drivers losing their jobs, the ones who remained on 
the job suffered from a new host of problems. 
Frustrated by the outcome, once FedEx shifted to the “multi-work 
area” business model in California, the Estrada attorneys sued again 
under California law. Alexander v. FedEx was filed and integrated into 
the multi-district litigation.210 The plaintiffs’ attorneys, led by Beth 
Ross, represented 2,300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers 
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in California between 2000 and 2007.211 These drivers worked for both 
FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery.212 While the multi-district 
litigation court in Indiana granted summary judgment to FedEx, on 
review, the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted summary judgment to 
the plaintiffs, finding all the necessary indicia of employee status.213 
4. EVADING ALEXANDER: THE RESTRUCTURING OF FEDEX AND THE 
INDEPENDENT SERVICE PROVIDERS AGREEMENT 
Despite the tremendous class action wins in Alexander and 
Estrada, FedEx ultimately evaded treating their ground drivers as 
employees. In response to Alexander and in recognition of the twelve 
states around the country that use a modified test to determine 
employee status in which the question of employee status turns on 
whether workers perform work that is a core component of the 
principal’s business, FedEx changed to an independent service provider 
(ISP) model.214 Under the ISP model, drivers are required to cover five 
service areas.215 According to Beth Ross, the plaintiffs’ lead attorney in 
Alexander, many of the ISP contractors do not drive and instead spend 
all of their time managing these routes. In addition to foisting the risk 
and responsibilities of business onto these “small businesses,” the ISP 
model also gives FedEx an additional level of protection against 
unionization.216 
Strikingly, the financial conditions of the ISP drivers are more 
precarious than they were before the Alexander litigation. As small 
business people, they are not properly remunerated for their work, nor 
are they able to provide secure employment for those who they hire. 
After spending a substantial portion of her career working on Alexander 
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and the multi-state misclassification litigation against FedEx, Ross 
reflected on the outcome: 
Drivers [post-Alexander] have little control over how they 
order their affairs. FedEx leaves them alone more than they 
used to, but they have a terrible financial problem. FedEx 
doesn’t pay them enough to really compensate the people who 
drive for them. A lot of them do not provide workers’ 
compensation or provide overtime. One plaintiff from 
Alexander, for example, has nine drivers and four of them are 
on public benefits. And not because he doesn’t pay them 
every penny he can. He does not even have health insurance 
for himself and his family.217 
Both Pontarolo and Rose confirmed Ross’s observations and explained 
that drivers’ work lives became more precarious after the decision in 
Alexander and FedEx’s subsequent business model changes. Pontarolo 
decided to sell her route and trucks. She told me about the ISP model: 
Things got worse when they brought in the ISP program. 
Basically, they thought, “how are we going to cover our 
behinds” and they made everyone have a huge work area. . . . 
And [so] you had to buy more service areas. They didn’t want 
people partnering up with other people. Basically, you had to 
sell out or you had to sell to somebody that would keep you as 
an employee under them. . . . I ended up selling out in 
March. I wasn’t going to deal with five trucks, five drivers, 
five times the insurance, five times the liability. But I lost 
money on both my routes. We lost $50,000 per route. And 
they promised all the guys [who participated in the ISP], “Oh 
you’ll make a million plus dollars a year with this new [ISP] 
contract.” But the people that I know who stayed say that it’s 
just horrible. Horrible. I see the trucks on the road and I just 
shake my head and think, “you guys are getting so 
screwed.”218 
Unlike Pontarolo, Rose attempted to continue working with FedEx after 
the ISP model was implemented. He signed an ISP contract and 
experienced what it was like to manage and pay a team of nine drivers. 
When I asked how he managed and whether he had been able to pay the 
drivers who worked for him, he lamented: 
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I gave them all that I could, but it wasn’t enough. I had no 
profit at the end of the year, let’s put it that way. I was 
actually losing a little bit of money each year. I couldn’t offer 
them decent benefits . . . FedEx just doesn’t pay enough. And 
I worked six days a week—all the time. My phone was never 
off; I did so much management work. It was a lot of stress, 
and I never made more than $54,000 a year. That was the 
most I ever made.219 
Overwhelmed, underpaid, and stressed, Rose, too, decided to sell his 
routes and his trucks. 
 Worker plaintiffs were not the only ones disappointed by the 
outcome. I spoke with another prominent plaintiff’s attorney who 
worked on the FedEx cases. Dmitri Igzitlan, who helped to craft a 
Seattle ordinance to give independent contractor gig workers the right 
to collectively bargain, told me that in drafting the legislation, he was 
drawing on the real-life failures and unexpected impacts of the 
misclassification litigation against FedEx. Igzitlan lamented, “I worked 
on FedEx for nine long years of my life, but I am not seeing the kinds 
of results that I had hoped. So, I am moving in another direction.”220 
III. LESSONS ON THE ROLE OF MISCLASSIFICATION LITIGATION ON 
WORKERS IN THE GIG ECONOMY 
In 1974, largely responding to the failure of Brown v. Board to de-
segregate public schools, Stuart Scheingold famously argued: 
[T]he . . . direct deployment of legal rights in the 
implementation of public policy will not work very well, 
given any significant opposition. Litigation may be helpful to 
individuals who have the resources and determination to 
pursue remedies through the court system. But courts cannot 
be relied upon to secure rights more generally . . . .221 
Following Scheingold’s excoriation of rights as “myths,” law and 
society scholars engaged in a dynamic debate about the relative 
constraints of courts in enacting social change. For some, most 
famously Gerald Rosenberg, litigation was a “hollow hope,” while for 
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others, including Michael McCann, litigation had the potential—in 
symbolic and strategic ways—to enact social change.222 In more recent 
years, social movement scholars in both political science and sociology 
have built on these arguments to examine—often through specific case 
studies—the internal and external effects of litigation. My examination 
of Tracy, Friendly Cab, and Alexander contributes to this conversation, 
utilizing both positivist and interpretivist understandings of the role of 
litigation in effecting social. Like Scheingold and Rosenberg, I identify 
reasons why litigation victories have not been successful in securing 
employee rights for workers. But following in the footsteps of Michael 
McCann, I am also interested in what symbolic and strategic impacts 
the litigation had, particularly on plaintiff-workers. How did the drivers 
in each case study make sense of the role of the litigation in their lives? 
Workers won the litigation battle, but lost the larger war for 
economic justice. In all three of the case studies, employee rights laws 
remained unenforced. These stories are important to be read and 
understood together: not only because they litigated different types of 
employment rights (safety-net rights, collective bargaining rights, and 
rights to wage security), but also because the long-term, on-the-ground 
outcome of each case study reflected a different type of risk in relying 
upon litigation to enforce change for workers in the gig economy. 
Scholars have long opined on the weak enforcement power of the 
judiciary to enforce social change. But in this section, I extrapolate two 
further lessons from the real-life failures of these litigation victories that 
are specific to the gig economy. First, the structural and political 
capital of many gig firms renders impotent the private enforcement of 
individual employee rights. And second, employee status may not be 
well-suited to the desires and goals of gig workers. 
A. The Structural and Political Capital of Firms 
As Scheingold first noted six decades ago, the “practical impact 
[of a litigation victory] . . . is restricted by post-judgment power 
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relationships.”223 In the employee rights context, this is not only 
because of the fragmented nature of judicial enforcement,224 as has been 
much noted, but also because of the relative structural and political 
imbalances outside the courtroom. The first lesson from these case 
studies, then, is not surprising: the legal recognition of employee rights 
does not have a redistributive effect on power between the worker-
plaintiffs and the firm-defendants. 
Outside the courtroom, plaintiffs in each case study continued to 
lack the structural capital of the companies that they were challenging. 
In Tracy, the implication of this was quite clear: workers were afraid of 
galvanizing their individual rights. In Friendly Cab, too, the fact that 
the companies could leverage expensive, aggressive lawyering to slow 
down the litigation discouraged worker-plaintiffs and enervated long-
term mobilization. The taxi company’s successful refusal to come to the 
bargaining table was itself a clear demonstration of their relative 
structural power. 
Beyond the obvious resource imbalance and the fact that it was not 
remedied by litigation, legally-imposed inequalities also contributed to 
the relative structural power of these firms to impede employee rights 
from being realized. For example, in Alexander, enforcement of rights 
was circumvented by a business restructuring endorsed by legal 
decisions. Corporate evasion of employment and labor laws through 
reorganization has long been sanctioned by courts. When companies 
began to use independent contractor labor in the 1970s to de-unionize 
their workforce, federal appellate courts found that such re-organization 
was the prerogative of capital and not subjective to collective 
bargaining.225 The legal entitlement of firms to restructure their 
business model undermines any redistributive power enabled by a 
judicial finding of employee status. Perhaps Alexander best exemplifies 
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the power of contemporary gig firms to reconstitute themselves in the 
face of misclassification victories. 
This lesson about the relative structural power of firms is also 
important to consider when assessing legislative approaches to address 
the grievances gig workers. For example, many contemporary 
academic and advocacy discussions on legislative solutions to worker 
precarity in the platform-enabled gig economy revolve around either 
expanding the definition of employee,226 or creating a new category of 
worker status227 (e.g. dependent contractor). But the outcome of the 
Alexander case study suggests that such popular policy strategies may 
be ineffective. Legally redefining who benefits from state protections 
does not address the power of firms to choose how to structure their 
workforce. As Noah Zatz aptly argues, “[T]weaking the line between 
[who is a protected worker and who is not] . . . seems doomed to 
intervene too late in a process that employers control from the outset, 
one that they control with at least one eye on the labor [and 
employment law] consequences.”228 
In addition to their structural power, the firms in these case studies 
were emboldened by their significant political capital. Though city 
regulators had the power to sanction taxicab companies for non-
compliance in Tracy, they never did, despite worker advocacy to this 
end. My interviews with both drivers and former city officials suggest 
that the owners of Friendly Cab wielded the power of their political 
relationships to maintain their hold of medallions—even those that were 
unused—essentially forcing the EBDA to choose misclassification 
litigation over regulatory advocacy to achieve self-ownership. As Jill 
Fisch has shown with her comprehensive study of FedEx’s political 
activities, FedEx’s corporate success is in large part a result of their 
political strategies, leveraging political participation to create a 
regulatory environment suitable to their ambitions and visions.229 
Fisch’s study underscores that when court decisions or a regulatory 
regime does not favor them, well-financed firms like FedEx turn to 
elected bodies—not just to evade laws but also to re-shape them to their 
liking. In the more recent gig economy, both Uber and Lyft have had 
great success at quietly but proactively using their political power to get 
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state legislation passed which codifies the status of their drivers as 
independent contractors. 
B. Worker Ambivalence Towards Employee Status 
The second, less obvious lesson from these case studies is an 
interpretive one, gleaned from the narratives of plaintiff workers in 
each case. In other work, I have shown how the duality of legal worker 
status has had a fractitious impact on worker organizing. In an 
ethnography of taxi workers in San Francisco, I found that some 
drivers wanted to be employees, while others valued their independent 
contractor status. This, I illustrated, became a point of contention and 
division during efforts towards collective mobilization. But in the case 
studies here—specifically in Friendly Cab and Alexander—the issue of 
employee status did not necessarily divide workers. Rather, worker-
plaintiffs who were fighting for employee status were themselves—from 
the very beginning—surprisingly ambivalent toward it. This finding 
highlights the degree to which misclassification litigation may be ill-
suited to the desires and visions of some workers operating in a “grey 
zone.” 
What did worker-plaintiffs want in these misclassification case 
studies, if not employee status? Both the Friendly Cab and the FedEx 
driver plaintiffs said they were attracted to the relative structural 
control enabled by independent contracting. Dale Rose, for example, 
explained that he joined FedEx because he wanted the flexibility 
enabled by self-management: 
I wanted to be an entrepreneur, and I wanted to be self-
employed. I wanted to manage my own schedule and to have 
some flexibility so that when things come up with the kids I 
c[ould] stop what I was doing to take care of that issue. I 
wanted the control, but that didn’t happen with FedEx. And it 
didn’t happen after Alexander.230 
Anwar Zadran and Marjorie Pontarolo pointed to similar reasons 
for joining the taxi and trucking industries, respectively. In each case, 
these workers were motivated to participate as plaintiffs in 
misclassification litigation not because they pined for employee status, 
but because they resented the degree to which the companies exerted 
control and interfered in their everyday work lives. In each case, 
workers complained about arbitrary discipline and stringent rules on 
behavior, dress, and deliverables. For them, participating in the 
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lawsuits was valuable as an act of resistance, not necessarily as a means 
to gain certain employee protections. 
In the case of FedEx, worker plaintiffs explained that they 
participated in the litigation to force the company to exert less control 
and to treat them more like they envisioned contractors should be 
treated. In the aftermath of Estrada and Alexander, workers got some 
independence, but only in exchange for an undesirable increase in risk. 
After FedEx moved to a multi-route business model following Estrada, 
Pontarolo reflected on how the changes she experienced negatively 
impacted her work life. She had wanted FedEx to stop interfering in 
her day-to-day work life—to stop telling her what to wear and 
disciplining her for not doing her work exactly as they wanted. But the 
way in which FedEx responded exacerbated her troubles. She told me: 
I mean, after Estrada, I actually injured myself one time 
taking a hundred-fifty-pound package upstairs. I pulled my 
arm out of my socket, and I told my manager, “What do I do 
in a situation like that?” His comment back to me was, “You 
need to service the customer, and if means getting that 
package up to their front door, then you have to do it.” They 
didn’t care if you hurt yourself. And they would still fine you 
if you complained!231 
In other words, while Pontarolo wanted to be treated more 
independently, the ways in which she and FedEx envisioned that 
independence were dramatically different. Pontarolo continued to want 
the support that came from working at a large corporation. After being 
injured, she saw an easy solution: FedEx could temporarily give her 
work to someone else. But to FedEx, such a reassignment was 
emblematic of employee status. She was told to deal with her problems 
independently, perhaps so that she would look more like a contractor, 
bearing the risk and losses associated with injury. To make things 
worse, in addition to having to bear this responsibility, Pontarolo 
remained subject to the whimsical disciplinary regime of managers, 
neither free to complain nor to ask for support. 
Rose acknowledged that FedEx’s post-Alexander restructuring did 
leave workers with more freedom from the everyday control exerted by 
the company than he had experienced after Estrada, but he bemoaned 
the remunerative realities of that independence. Rose said: 
I feel bad for the drivers now. A lot of the drivers like the 
work. It gives them freedom; they don’t have a supervisor 
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looking over their shoulder every hour of the day. But it’s the 
compensation. They’re driving, and they see an experienced 
UPS driver who is probably receiving $120,000 overall 
compensation a year, including benefits and retirement. 
Versus an average driver at FedEx right now is probably 
making $40,000 a year with very few benefits.232 
Thus, to some extent, the litigation left Rose and his colleagues 
with the physical freedom they wanted, but the structure of the 
company severely limited the pecuniary possibilities of their work. Not 
only were their earnings one-third that of unionized truck drivers, but 
they also bore the additional stresses of managing and not being able to 
adequately pay their own employees. This latter impact drove Rose 
from the business altogether. 
In the case of Friendly Cab, worker ambivalence towards potential 
employee status worked slightly differently. In Friendly Cab, the 
misclassification litigation derailed the workers’ primary goal of 
cooperative self-ownership. When the Teamsters took up their cause, 
they made the understandable decision to discourage workers from 
becoming small business owners. “That wasn’t our goal,” said the 
Teamsters’ business manager.233 The union, their attorneys, and even 
the city regulators instead endorsed the path most familiar to them: 
employee status. In theory, achieving collective bargaining rights for 
the drivers would give the union new members, give their attorneys the 
opportunity to advance good “worker-friendly” law, and make the job 
of city regulators in dealing with the taxi company much easier. But the 
many years of intense intransigence and hard-fought litigation on the 
part of the taxi companies enervated worker desires to mobilize through 
collective power. In reflecting on the case, Caren Sencer, the attorney 
who argued Friendly Cab on behalf of the East Bay Drivers’ 
Association before the Ninth Circuit, lamented, “[T]he biggest 
problem, I think, was that the drivers did not want to be employees.”234 
Workers pushed for employee status as a way to hold the company 
accountable and to potentially improve their work lives. But it was a 
second-best goal for them. What they wanted was shared self-
ownership—a progressive vision that no one helped them to achieve. 
Nevertheless, across the three case studies, how workers 
conceptualized the role of the litigation in their lives varied. The 
plaintiff-workers from Alexander found the litigation process 
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empowering because it gave them the opportunity to air their 
grievances and to hold the company financially accountable in a limited 
sense. Pontarolo said: 
I would do it all over again just to show FedEx that they can’t 
do that to us little guys that make them what they are, that 
was the thing that I was so—excuse my French—but so pissed 
off about at the time was we made them what they were and 
are today.235 
Rose, too, called the attorneys who litigated the cases his “heroes” and 
marveled at the litigation win, “I mean it was the biggest settlement in 
history with a case like this and that was satisfaction.”236 
In contrast, the EBDA drivers from Friendly Cab were resentful at 
having spent years trying to get the right to collectively bargain. 
Having lost their jobs in the litigation process, many of these drivers 
were left with no other options to support themselves or their families. 
The financial desperation they found themselves in made them wonder 
what would have happened if they could have just gotten a hold of a 
few medallions instead of nearly a decade resisting their employer. 
Some looked back at the hard work of the Teamsters and believed that 
the union had deradicalized the objectives of their grassroots 
movement, only to abandon them later. Zadran lamented, “We did all 
of that . . . for what?” 237 
Joe Tracy fell somewhere in between these two extremes. He had 
a great deal of respect for the attorneys who represented him and the 
class he represented. But he was exhausted and left worker organizing 
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Figure 1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM MISCLASSIFICATION 
LITIGATION CASE STUDIES 
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Taken together, these three case studies from the antecedent gig 
economy provide empirical data for both sides of the debate on the role 
of litigation in social change. On the one hand, although rights were too 
easily dismantled after Tracy, the decision ensured that taxi workers 
were not forced to pay cash bonds to the cab companies in San 
Francisco for many decades to come. The Ninth Circuit decision in 
Friendly Cab created good precedent that undoubtedly influenced how 
companies considering use of independent contractor labor structuring 
their work. And though FedEx got themselves out from underneath the 
holdings of Estrada and Alexander through business restructuring, the 
millions of dollars they were forced to pay to drivers constituted some 
transfer of wealth. And the publicity around these cases raised public 
awareness by revealing the vulnerabilities of these workers.239  
On the other hand, these judicial victories were followed by real-
life losses for workers. By and large, these cases did not effect what 
they set out to accomplish, nor did they spur or support worker 
movements more broadly. Because it took time for the outcomes to 
unfold, the public was left with the impression that justice had been 
 
 239 McCann, supra note 27, at 83–84. 
2017:739 Winning the Battle, Losing the War? 801 
served, that the system had worked, and that people being cheated out 
of livelihoods were righted. It took a few years for FedEx to roll out 
their ISP model, and it took a few months for workers to determine that 
this ISP structure itself was exploitative. After the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the rights of the EBDA to collectively bargain with Friendly 
Cab, months passed before the Teamsters announced that they could not 
support the drivers. And of course, Tracy took many years to become 
ineffectual. 
For social movement scholars, my findings across these case 
studies may be intuitive: relying on litigation alone will not affect 
security for workers. For advocates fighting for workers’ rights in the 
gig economy, however, employee status is understood as the umbrella 
under which workers must stand to achieve security. As a result, 
litigation to achieve employee status seems like the logical place to pour 
resources and energy. What the post-litigation stories of Tracy, 
Friendly Cab, and Alexander underscore that for political and structural 
reasons, firms can too easily push workers out from under these hard-
won protections or deter them from seeking protection at all. Further, 
the self-visions and desires of workers do not necessarily align with the 
goals of the misclassification litigation. Litigation victories for 
employee rights in the gig economy are, thus, by themselves, 
ineffective.  
Scott Cummings and others have convincingly argued that with 
low-wage workers, in order to be successful, litigation must be a “part 
of a comprehensive campaign that deploys multiple strategies” to 
advance economic justice.240 In all three of these case studies, while 
workers’ may have been centered—the litigation was not “politically 
integrated,” as Cummings defines it.241 Accordingly, I maintain that for 
social change actors—workers, lawyers, organizations, and labor 
leaders—considering how to achieve economic justice in the gig 
economy, the “opportunities and constraints”242 of misclassification 
litigation must be constantly considered. What will the challenges be to 
enforcing the litigation outcome, even if the plaintiffs win? What will 
be the firm’s structural and political responses to that litigation? How 
can worker advocates preempt such responses? 
Politically-integrated litigation means ensuring that lawsuits are not 
filed without exploring and employing multiple strategies for change 
from the outset—including policy, organizing, and media initiatives. 
Doug NeJaime, in examining the positive impacts of litigation loss on 
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social change (the opposite of what I have done with these case 
studies), makes the important point that much of the research and 
literature in this debate actually fails to understand legislation and 
litigation as integrated parts of a strategy for change.243 However, with 
respect to the gig economy—both old and new—litigation has been, by 
and large, the only strategy, to the detriment of utilizing other avenues 
for social change. In short, these wins in court have precluded both the 
building and maintenance of both collective worker power and 
legislative action. 
Politically-integrated misclassification litigation is much easier 
discussed than enacted, especially by dispersed, atomized workers and 
decentralized advocates operating across both public and private arenas. 
However, as I discussed in this Article, on-demand gig economy firms 
have carried out their own form of politically-integrated advocacy—
defending lawsuits, lobbying for new laws to protect their independent 
contractor model, and deploying savvy public relations campaigns that 
include the mobilization of consumers. Labor, by contrast, has almost 
solely relied on lawsuits.  
While litigation has taken the center stage in the fight against the 
contemporary gig economy, the case studies from the antecedent gig 
economy are clear: even if successful, these lawsuits will not make 
insecure work secure. After spending twenty years litigating 
misclassification cases, Beth Ross, who valiantly led FedEx drivers 
through multi-state litigation, through a win in Estrada and Alexander 
emphasized, “Litigation is not the answer. It is part of the strategy, but 
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